

# Dutch Fire Narrative



**CA-KNF- 0505**  
**ORCA IMT2**  
**August 1 –August 5 2010**



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# **NARRATIVE SUMMARY**

## **INTRODUCTION**

Fire crews responded to the Dutch Fire on July 31, 2010. The Fire is within the Empire and Dutch Creek Drainages on the north side of the Klamath River in the Klamath National Forest, approximately 9 miles west of the Colliers Rest Stop on Interstate I-5. The community of Gottville is about 1 mile west of the fire on State Highway 96.

### **Mobilization**

August 1, 2010 the ORCA Incident Management Team (IMT2), with Brett Fillis as Incident Commander (IC), was mobilized to the Dutch Fire. The ORCA team received the mobilization order for the Dutch Fire during the late evening hours of July 31, 2010. The long team was ordered. Mobilization for the team began Sunday August 1<sup>st</sup> and the team reported for an Agency Administrator's in-briefing in Yreka California at the Klamath National Forest Headquarters at 1400 hours. The Incident Command Post was established at the Colliers Rest Stop at the junction of Interstate I-5 and Highway 96.

The Delegation of Authority was signed on August 1, 2010 and the ORCA Team assumed command at 06:00 on Monday August 1, 2010.

The team operated in Unified Command with CAL FIRE. The Incident Commanders were Brett Fillis (ORCA), and Jim Sweet (CAL FIRE).

### **Transfer of Command**

The ORCA team IC, Brett Fillis was provided a delegation of authority and assumed command of the Dutch Fire at 0600 on August 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2010. Incident complexity at the type 2 level was validated by the IC and operations were conducted as such. Transfer of Command back to the District ICT4 Brad Rafeedy occurred at 0600 on August 5<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

## **COMMAND**

### **Unified Command**

This command structure worked very well. A cost share agreement was developed and signed by the Agency Administrators. Both IC's attended meetings and worked with and utilized the ORCA Command and General Staff.

### **Closure Orders**

There were no public road, trail or waterway closures.

## **Safety**

The Safety Record during the ORCA team management of the Dutch incident was excellent with no motor vehicle accident and no lost time injuries. There were only a few fire fighter minor injuries that included cuts and scratches, bruises and blisters, poison oak and one bee sting.

### **Primary Hazards and Safety Concerns**

**Driving:** Highway 96 which provided access to the incident was a concern due to a history of vehicle accidents from speeding vehicles and deer crossing the highway. Drivers were warned about this situation during briefings and information on safe driving was included in the IAP Safety Messages and on the 215A's.

**Snags/Fire Damaged Trees:** With a large portion of the fire being in a grass/ brush vegetation stage, snags and fire weakened trees did not present a major safety hazard on most of the fire area. Where hazard trees were found, mitigation measures were employed and described in the IAP Safety Messages and the 215A's.

**Aircraft:** Helicopter usage on the incident created a safety hazard to the public that required mitigation. The flight path taken from the dip site on the Klamath River crossed Highway 96 to the incident. A dip site manager ensured that no traffic was coming when the helicopters crossed the highway and the public was kept out of the area that was being utilized for dipping.

**LCES:** Strict adherence to making sure LCES was in place prior to engagement was focused on in the IAP as well as on the ground with daily briefings, divisional breakouts, crew briefings, and random interviews on the line. Escape routes were identified daily by supervisors on the fireline. Due to vegetation type and terrain, good black was used for safety zones as construction of safety zones proved impractical in most instances.

**Other Hazards/Concerns:** Other hazards were identified throughout the incident and were stressed upon at some point throughout the incident by inclusion in the IAP Safety Messages and briefings. These include but are not limited to Hydration, Fatigue, Rattlesnakes and Bees.

**Medical Visits:** See Medical Unit Leader Narrative for Statistical Information

**Reportable Injuries:** 0 during the ORCA Command of the incident

**Injury Frequency:** The Department of Labor Formula for calculating injury frequency rates is based on the number of lost time injuries and the amount of exposure measured by hours worked. It compares the number of injuries occurring on a given operation with the normal injury rate for 100 workers working for one year (200,000 hours) using the lost-time criteria to define an injury. The formula is:

Injury Frequency Rate = Number of Injuries X (200,000 / Number of Hours Worked on the Incident)

Injury Frequency Rate for the ORCA IMT while assigned to the Dutch Fire:  
(0) Lost Time Injury X 200,000 / the hours worked during ORCA assignment = 0  
The Bureau of Labor Standards considers 13.5 as an acceptable injury frequency rate.

SAFECOM- One Safecom was reported during the incident involving the dropping of a blivet from a helicopter due to equipment malfunction prior to the Team assuming command.

SAFENET- No Safenets were reported during the incident.

### **Human Resources**

ORCA Team member Yolanda M. Barnett (HRSP) arrived at base camp on August 01, 2010 1730.

HRSP attended and spoke at morning and evening briefings, and section meetings. Human Resource messages emphasized Mutual Respect, Team camaraderie, self and coworker's safety.

Prevention was priority #1 to help prevent issues from arising. Supervisors, managers, crew bosses and all fire personnel were encouraged to resolve issues and concerns early on, and seek assistance from HRSP.

There were no Human Resource issue contacts for the Dutch Incident, and no unresolved issues.

### **Information**

**Media:** Despite the relatively small size of the fire, heavy media interest existed throughout the short duration of the fire because it was one of the only fires in the West. All three network affiliate television stations from Medford physically visited the fire ground and filmed and interviewed firefighters and property owners. Because of this interest, one PIO spent considerable time on Saturday July 31, Sunday August 1 and Monday August 2, escorting television crews through the fire ground and answering questions at the ICP about the fire.

**Telephone calls:** PIO's received more than six calls an hour throughout the day on Monday with media and public inquiries about the fire.

**Rural Interface:** Citizen interest was especially keen on Saturday July 31 because of the smoke column visible from Yreka to the Rogue Valley. Seven residents were in close

proximity to the fire, but the fire quickly moved north of several homes and the northern line held, reducing the danger to the residents to the north.

**Staffing:** Two PIO2s and a third trainee plus a qualified PIO from CALFIRE were assigned responsibilities with the Joint Command. When the fire held within the 371 acre perimeter, this complement of PIO staff proved adequate. Had the fire moved outside of the original 522 acre polygon, additional PIO staff would have been needed and the FS trainee and the CALFIRE PIO would have needed to be freed for duties exclusively related to the fire.

**Trap Line:** The trainee ran a trap line stopping in the community of Klamath River at the post office and the Ranger Station and at Quigley's Store along Highway 96. The trap line was useful in informing residents and travelers passing through the Klamath River area. Had the fire moved north beyond the 522 acre polygon, the ensuing smoke attracting public attention would have required the consideration of expanding the trap line.

## **OPERATIONS SECTION**

### **Ground Operations**

Following the in-briefing, the Operations Section began developing our strategies and tactics based on identified priorities and available resources. The information that we received in the in-briefing was that fire may be lined by end of shift that day (August 1) at 371 acres. This information set the team up for a scenario of massive demob based on the status of ordered resources responding to the incident.

Based on our most current intelligence from the local IC, Klamath National Forest, CAL FIRE and responding Team members decided on the most appropriate number of resources to deploy on the next day shift. The Team began canceling orders and expediting the demob process for excess resources as quickly as possible.

Our first day shift focused was on securing fire lines and mopping up the fire perimeter. We were successful in holding the fire to the original 371 acres through the operational period. We anticipated no control problems of the fire and began to plan out the next three operational periods, downsizing the resources each day. Suppression repair work was identified and we began to commit resources to specific areas early on to ensure the completion of the work prior to turning back the fire to the district.

Due to all of the good work from the Klamath National Forest and CAL FIRE prior to the team arrival, the incident was easily put to bed, and the turn back standards established were met in just a few days. The fire was turned over to a Type 4 organization just four days after the team arrival.

## Air Operations

At that time, Aviation resources already on the fire consisted of two type I, two type II and one type III helicopters and an air attack fixed wing platform. The Cobra Firewatch AA509 was also available to the incident as an alternate air attack and mapping resource. Aircraft assigned to the Dutch Fire are listed below in Table 1. All helicopters are exclusive use. One type I, one type II and the type III are positioned locally and have remained available for IA response throughout the incident. Missions consisted primarily of water drops totaling 47,500 gallons and delivery of approximately 15,900 lbs. of cargo.

On August 3, 2010 both type I helicopters responded for IA on other fires. Aircraft 74D was reassigned to the Bar fire on the Plumas National Forest and 137BH returned to Siskiyou airport.

On August 4, 2010, helitack crew 502 aircraft FSXX, remained assigned to the Dutch Fire but operated out of their home unit in Scott Valley. At end-of-shift on August 4, all aircraft were released to their home units.

**Table 1**

<b>FAA N#</b>	<b>TY</b>	<b>MAKE/MODEL</b>
137BH	1	S-70
74D	1	BV-107
144WA	2	Bell 212
FSXX	2	Bell 205++
26HX	3	AS 305A
N501 TC	FW	Aero Commander 500
AA05	FW	Aero Commander 500
AA509	2	Cobra
Stockdale Comm. Trailer	E-29	

## **PLANS SECTION**

### **In-Briefing**

Transition of the Dutch Fire from the Klamath National Forest to the ORCA IMT was conducted by Ed Guzman, Klamath National Forest Fire Staff Officer 1400 on August 1 at 1400. An in-briefing binder was prepared and key information was presented to ORCA Incident Management Team. Special attention was given to the significance of community relations, smoke management, cost effectiveness, and safety of firefighters and the public. Water, fish, wildlife and cultural resource concerns were described along with concern for noxious weeds.

A delegation of authority was reviewed and signed by the Forest Supervisor, and ORCA Incident commander. The fire was managed through unified command with CAL FIRE Incident Commander, Jim Sweet.

A WFDSS was completed and presented to the Team that outlined the overall strategy, management concerns and line officers decision and rationale. The cost projection was completed using the 50% stratified cost index. The IMT cost for the incident fell within the projected cost, however at a higher level than the 50% for the final fire size. This was largely due to the better than expected success at suppressing this fire at a smaller acreage. This provided a better outcome by reducing fire fighter exposure, and less concern for smoke management. In addition, a high level of resources were ordered for the Dutch fire in anticipation of a longer duration fire, and contingency line was built to the north which, if used, would have increased fire size. The suppression cost is anticipated to still fall within historic stratified cost levels, likely around the 70% level.

The plans section was fully staffed for most of the incident with additional support by trainees. Two local type 3 RESL/plans trainees were provided shadow assignments at the request of the forest. Both were excellent candidates for future plans training.

Line officer participation utilizing their Agency Representative was excellent throughout the incident. Overall, the ORCA team got excellent support and cooperation from the Forest staff. Agency and cooperators involvement through the entire incident was excellent. Plans offered to input KDLs for the Agency rep, however with the short duration of the incident, the AR did not take us up on that. The team did prepare and input a few pertinent KDLs.

Working with CAL FIRE in unified command was a very positive experience. It provided the opportunity for us to become better integrated, and operate in a smooth manner. In the future, if a long duration incident additional of other CAL FIRE personnel onto the IMT would add to our successful operation, such as a plans person, to help set up for check in, tracking, and demob of resources. Our plans coordination on this short incident was totally adequate and worked well.



It worked well for the IMT, and was a good cost efficiency measure to take a couple hours after briefing on day one to assess the apparent overstaffed suppression resource situation, and develop a quick strategy to demobilize and release surplus resources in an abbreviated fashion. We appreciated the flexibility in working with Expanded Dispatch and North Ops to work out an abbreviated system. If there was a lot of fire activity elsewhere, we could have built in a longer demobilization, but in this case it worked out most efficiently for the forest and the GACC.

The resource advisors were excellent, providing timely and valuable input to the team, especially to fireline resources, and DIVS. They prepared an appropriate repair plan for this incident, and communicated well with the team.

The Plans section struggled with our lack of phones and internet in meeting our expectations for providing products in a timely manner (209s, IAPs, maps etc) electronically to the Forest and GACC. We did some work-arounds, but we did not always meet our intended timeframes and our level of expectation. Some of our decisions to not order better internet and phone networks was driven by the expected short duration of the incident and a desire to keep costs to a minimum.

### **Resources Unit**

A summary of current resources was provided by the host unit and the Type 3 Resources Unit Leader at the in-briefing. Following in-briefing, a well-staffed Resources Unit was established at the Colliers Rest Stop ICP. On August 1, the CTSPs set up the network computers and loaded the I-Suite program and the Demob and Resources modules were used for the duration of the Incident. Daily downloads from the Resource Order Status System (ROSS) by the CTSP and checking Resource Orders from ROSS printouts provided valuable information and made updating as well as accuracy of the ISUITE database much easier.

The first IAP was produced at the local USFS office. North Tree office service at ICP was utilized for printing 150-330 IAPs nightly and plotting large briefing posters at the ICP. Initially one day and one night shift was produced, with the subsequent IAPs covering a 24 hour shifts. The Team did not have reliable connection to the internet and initially did not post IAPs on an FTP site until August 3, 2010.

Seventy-seven Overhead, 31 Crews, and 28 Equipment resources (including several Strike Teams) were checked in. However, there were a number of other Overhead, Crews and Equipment resources assigned to the incident that were not entered into the Isuite database.

### **Documentation Unit**

The ORCA Team arrived with no documentation leader. The Resources unit collected documentation, and a documentation kit from the local forest arrived on August 3, 2010. The Resources unit filed the records on a daily basis.

Documents were collected throughout the incident, with special attention paid to original documents such as the IAP's, WFDSS, Delegation of Authority, Repair Plans, and Contingency Plans. These documents and others were filed in accordance with the Memo dated June 5, 2008 from the NWCG and the "IMT Instructions for Fire Incident Records Management" shown on the nifc.gov website under Policies, Records Management. The Documentation records were transferred to the Klamath Forest on August 5, 2010.

### **Situation Unit**

On August 1, 2010 the Situation Unit arrived for in-briefing at the Klamath National Forest Headquarters at 1400 hours. Contact was made with GIS person and received briefing on Dutch Fire status. Departed from the headquarters at 1930 hours for the ICP at Colliers Rest Stop north of Yreka, California. Products that day included, Briefing map, Division operations maps, IAP map for next operational shift. The ISC-209 (Incident Status Summary) was completed by Yreka Dispatch with assistance from ORCA Situation Unit.

IR Flights were conducted on August 1 and 2.

August 1, 2010- GISS support was moved from Yreka to ICP. The Situation Unit assisted in the transition from Klamath Forest Supervisor's Office support to the GISS person on the ORCA Team .

August 2, 2010- The Situation Unit produced a Briefing map, Operations map, Transportation map, IR map, and IAP map.

August 3, 2009- Prepared base GISS data for transition back to Klamath National Forest.

Maps and products produced for the Dutch Fire includes but are not limited to:

- Publishing ICS- 209 Incident Status Summary reports by 1800 daily
- Briefing Maps
- Operational Maps
- IAP Maps
- Transportation Map
- Final Perimeter Map

### **Fire Behavior**


The Dutch Fire was detected on July 31, 2010 at 1620. The fire originated in fine fuels on or adjacent to private lands low in the Dutch Creek drainage of the Klamath River, and spread rapidly upslope. Fuels in the fire area consisted of grass, brush and scattered pockets of timber litter that displayed high intensity fire behavior and rapid rates of spread. Propagation of the fire spread was enhanced by short range spotting in the grass and brush component. The fire started at an elevation of 2000 feet and ran upslope to 3400 feet (approximately) before suppression actions halted fire spread.

Aggressive interagency initial attack forces encircled the fire with a control line that evening resulting in no additional fire spread. The initial control line was completed on July 31<sup>st</sup> and presented very minor resistance to control throughout the IMT's tenure, primarily due to the complete combustion of the fuels present within the perimeter.


On August 2, the ORCA Type 2 Incident Management Team (IC Brett Fillis) assumed management of the fire under a unified command structure with CAL FIRE, represented by Jim Sweet. There was very minor resistance to control throughout the IMT's tenure, primarily due to the complete combustion of the fuels present within the perimeter. A daily chronology of fire weather and behavior is redundant and therefore not included in Section 2 of the Narrative.

Representative weather data for the fire area was obtained from the Oak Knoll Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS). Information was acquired from infrared flight perimeter (IAP maps), conversations with line personnel, as well as field observations by Steve Ziel (FBAN) and Jim Hampton (FBAN (T)). The report is inclusive of July 31 – August 4, 2010.

The following image displays the 7-day period (temperature-red, and humidity-blue) prior to the ORCA IMT involvement, through August 3rd.



The following image displays the Energy Release Component (ERC) for the Northwestern Mountains PSA. ERC may serve as an indicator of seasonal trend and cumulative fire danger. The ERC forecast values for July 31 – August 4 indicate fire danger in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile value range.



## Weather

Predicted fire behavior and forecast weather was provided by the ORCA IMT at morning briefings. Daily Spot Weather Forecasts were issued by the Medford National Weather Service office. The primary weather pattern during the period consisted of a weak thermal trough with pockets of mildly unstable air which contributed to periodic, widely scattered, short-lived cumulus development. This pattern resulted in a hot, dry and relatively stable airmass over the fire area. This pattern is expected to hold until August 5<sup>th</sup> when instability builds resulting in increased cumulus development with the potential for scattered thunderstorms in the afternoon, with increasing chances of thunderstorms through the region on August 6<sup>th</sup>.

## Fuels

Representative fuels in the general fire area consist of cured grass, brush with cured grass beneath, and timber-understory, best characterized by Standardized Fire Behavior Fuel Models GR2, GS2, and TU5 as validated in the field by the FBAN and trainee. The following image displays the input values used in calculating fire behavior characteristics for this incident.

**Inputs: SURFACE**

Description

**Fuel/Vegetation, Surface/Understory**

Fuel Model

**Fuel Moisture**

1-h Moisture %

10-h Moisture %

100-h Moisture %

Live Herbaceous Moisture %

Live Woody Moisture %

**Weather**

Midflame Wind Speed (upslope) mi/h


**Terrain**

Slope Steepness %


**Fire Behavior**

The following graphs display the range of potential fire behavior characteristics that fell within the range of conditions present during suppression activities on the Dutch incident.

**Flame Length**



## Rate of Spread



## Demob Unit

A Demob Plan was prepared and signed by the ORCA Incident Commander, Section chiefs, and Yreka Interagency Command Center Expanded Dispatch (CA-YICC). Release priorities were included as given to the Team from North Ops, through Expanded Dispatch.

On the day the ORCA team assumed command of the fire there were extensive resource surplus to the needs of the fire. The team worked with expanded, to implement an abbreviated demob procedures in order to more effectively manage resources and costs of the incident. This worked well and there were approximately 20 resources (crews, engines and strike teams) released within a few hours.

The demob complexity was fairly simple, with only one air flight.

The Yreka Incident Command Center Expanded Dispatch was very helpful and did an excellent job.

Overall, Demob went very well due to interagency cooperation and the professional individuals that we worked with on a daily basis.

## Computer Services

Pre-Order of rental computing devices was great; they were delivered prior to the arrival of the team on Sunday, and in the proper number.

Internet service from Northtree Fire International clerical service was disappointing. Northtree suffered from a series of problems throughout the incident that diminished their

ability to provide their service. Contracted internet was probably available 50% of the time after we were allowed connection to the Northtree router in the afternoon Tuesday 8/3. Prior to this time we could use a computer in the Northtree clerical trailer on an as needed basis. The Plans Chief discussed these concerns with Northtree and the billing to the office for internet services was reduced accordingly.

During internet outages we used a Verizon AirCard to upload and download critical information. The availability of the Aircard technology was critical and this technology should always be available to the team for such a backup function. Orca had the use of a 12dbi antenna which improved the wi-fi signal but we need to improve this technology, perhaps using an amplifier.

We experimented with SPOT personal GPS devices which look to be a promising technology for tracking resources in the field. This is an ORCA Team item that we use to increase efficiencies on incidents.

Version 10.0 of the I-Suite application was released just days before ORCA deployment, and proved to have a number of bugs that diminished the Finance sections efficiency.

Expediter's Camp-in-the-box facilities were fine, electrical power (necessary for constant network services) was steady except for a 10 minute outage 8/4 09:15, which was resolved quickly.

**Training**

The Dutch Fire incident provided an opportunity for 32 trainees to initiate training documentation of the Dutch fire with the Incident Training Specialist.

AGENCY	COMMAND	OPERATIONS	PLANS	LOGISTICS	FINANCE	AIR OPS	TOTAL
Federal	1	12	6	3	2	1	25
State							
Total	1	12	6	3	2	1	25

Dutch Fire Trainees have discussed their training goals with a qualified Training Specialist. Contact with trainees and evaluators were made through announcements at briefings and information provided within the IAP. The Training Specialist made individual contacts on an as needed basis.

One Interagency Fire Program Management (IFPM/2010) employee was provided a field training opportunity leading to recommendation for qualification.

Any State trainees were handled by CAL FIRE.

No injuries were reported of incident trainees.

One trainee received recommendations for qualification

## **LOGISTICS SECTION**

### **General Overview**

The Colliers Rest area was a good location for a fire camp. There were some size considerations mostly due to parking. The proximity to Yreka made for easy procurement of needed items. Typical of Siskiyou County, radio communications was a problem which seemed a bit more challenging because of the mountains around Colliers Rest Stop.

### **Facilities**

The camp supported at the highest 750 people based on dinner meal counts. The partially shaded grass area made a good sleeping area. There are no unresolved issues.

### **Ground Support**

The ground support unit was actually quite small. We had adequate drives and support vehicles for our needs. All equipment and supplies will be returned. There are no unresolved issues.

### **Supply Unit**

The Supply function was kept to a minimum for two reasons. First, the small size of the fire required less support, and the second, the support from Deadwood Camp. All books will be reconciled and closed. There are no unresolved issues.

### **Medical Unit**

The Medical unit was staffed with three EMT's, all working line assignments. There was also the Incident Management Specialist Manager and the Medical Unit Leader. They took care of 103 people with minor ailments. The most serious case was one bee sting and the most common was poison oak/rashes (59 cases). The rest were sore muscles, sprains, blisters and a few miscellaneous ailments. There are no unresolved issues.

### **Communications Unit**

The communication from Colliers Rest Stop was a bit of a problem. Due to the location of the fire, we kept the system to one Command Repeater and one Logistics Repeater. If the fire had left the single canyon, then many more repeaters would have been needed. All radio kits will be returned to Boise. There are no unresolved issues.

## **FINANCE SECTION**

### **General Overview**

The Complete Finance Package has been transitioned to the Forest. Any unresolved financial issues have been documented and discussed with the Forest IBA and the District. For follow up or feedback on financial issues from this incident, contact, Patty Westgate, ORCA FSC2, 541-892-8432.



## **Cost Unit**

A Total Cost Report as of 8/4, is attached to this Narrative. Total cost projected through 8/7/2010, is approximately 2.9 Million dollars. Numerous cost containment measures were implemented by the ORCA IMT upon arrival and assessment of the incident. A summary of cost saving actions taken is attached.

There was a Cost Share Agreement between the Klamath National Forest and CAL FIRE. The Forest Service responsibility is 100%, with the exception of all CAL FIRE engines and dozers. Cost of State engines and dozers are not to be included in the billing to the Forest Service.

## **Time and Procurement Unit (Equipment & Personnel)**

Payments for released resources have been audited and transmitted to ASC by the ORCA team. Copies of all payment records and the transmittal information remain in the finance records. Time records for remaining resources have been transferred and discussed with Lynda Jones at Oak Knoll District Office who will provide financial support for remaining resource

The short duration of the incident combined with minimal communications (no fax, minimal internet, reliance on cell phones) may have resulted in some “short cut” processes. There are no known financial issues in Procurement or Time.

On August 2, several resources excess to incident needs were released before the ISUITE database was operational. All Agency resources were released to their home unit with only the original copies of their CTRs. Copies of CTRs were kept in the finance package. Minimal Contract resources were closed out on manual invoices.

Region 5 Contracting Officer P. J. Vilhauer was assigned to work with our team which was very appreciated and beneficial. Overall support to finance from the Forest was excellent.

Coordination with CAL FIRE was excellent, with finance contact Harper Keene tracking their finances and providing needed information to the IMT Finance.

## **Comp/Claims Unit**

Comp for Injury cases were minimal with no lost time injuries. Two cases of medical treatment and 3 additional precautionary CA-1 (Report of Accidental Injury) reports processed for Federal resources.

Documentation for one potential private party claim for damage to an electric line for a water source damaged during suppression action was filed and status discussed with the Forest IBA and District A.O.

There were no requests for replacement or repair of non-standard property items.

Claim documentation, logs, and Injury logs are stored in the finance records.

## **2. CHRONOLOGY**

### **Ground Operations**

Fire weather and behavior was relatively static through the operational periods and summarized in the Fire Behavior/Weather section.

#### **August 1, 2010**      Sunday

Operations Section was activated by IC Brett Fillis at 0600 hrs. Kit Jacoby and Larry Pingel were instructed to go to the fire, check in and gather intelligence. The remainder of the Operations Section arrived in Yreka CA around 1400 hrs. for our in-briefing with Forest at the Forest Supervisors Office . After the in-briefing we worked on the plans for the following day's IAP. We were assigned a 371 acre fire that was anticipated to be lined by the IA resources on scene prior the team taking over the next operational shift. The ORCA Team was given no IA responsibility.

#### **August 2, 2010**      Monday

The team took over command of the incident at 0600 hrs. There was an over abundance of resource orders for the incident due to the potential the fire had to become very large. Realizing that the potential for the incident to become large had diminished significantly, we quickly began demobing resources based on need. We established DIVS A, B, M, and Z. DIVS M, was instructed to improve dozer lines, patrol, hold and mopup. DIVS B, consisted of the contingency line that was put in and were instructed to improve and scout for new opportunities for further contingency. DIVS M, was instructed to complete hand line as needed, patrol, hold and mop up. Also, plumb as needed and check for hotspots. DIVS Z, was instructed to continue structure assessment, patrol, hold and mop up. Staging was later identified for three type 1 crews that the forest requested. Near the end of the shift it was reported that almost all DIVS had completed a minimum of 150ft plus in on mop up and some areas were already up to 300ft in on mop up. This triggered some additional downsizing of resources.

#### **August 3, 2010**      Tuesday

Due to all the good work on previous shift, our mop up standard was anticipated to be easily met today. DIVS A was instructed to patrol, hold and mop up 300ft in and ensure 100 percent on any fire that went over the ridge line to the west. DIVS B was instructed to begin the suppression repair of the dozer line and a excavator was order to help accomplish this task. DIVS M was instructed to patrol, hold mop up 300ft in, plumb as needed and check for spots. DIVS Z was instructed to patrol, hold and mop up 300ft in. Also they began chipping slash along the Dutch Cr Rd as identified in the suppression repair plan. This is to be the last day of staging three type one crews in camp, they are being reassigned on Wed morning to local districts on the forest. Near the end of shift, it was reported that the mop up standard had been met on all divisions and there would one

more day shift of suppression repair and gridding for any remaining hotspots prior to turn back to the district at 0600 on Thursday morning. This triggered the demob of many resources Tuesday evening and Wednesday morning including some right sizing of overhead positions.

**August 4, 2010**      Wednesday

Resources for today are minimal, and all resources assigned today will be staying on with the incident when it is turned back to the district tomorrow at 0600 except some aircraft and heavy equipment. The aircraft and heavy equipment will be all demobed by end of shift today that is in excess of the turn back tomorrow. DIVS A, M, Z was instructed to continue to grid and mop any remaining hotspots and continues with suppression repair work. DIVS B was instructed to continue level two suppression repair work and finish as much as possible prior to end of shift to ensure the release of heavy equipment at the end of day. It was reported that we will have met all turn back standards by end of shift and that we are on track to release the fire back to local unit at 0600 tomorrow morning.

**August 5, 2010**      Thursday

The fire was released back to the local unit this morning at 0600 to a local type 4 team. Team will close out at 1000 with the local forest.

### **3. APPENDIX (attachments)**

Delegation of Authority

Key Decision Logs

Cost Analysis charts and graphs

Summary of cost-saving measures

ICS-209s (first, peak and last)

Final perimeter map