



# Post Incident Action Summary



## ***Garza Incident***

CA FKU 009755

July 9 - 22, 2017

## ***CAL FIRE***

## **Incident Management Team 2**

Glenn Patterson, Incident Commander

Ron Myers, Deputy Incident Commander

Gary Croucher, Incident Commander - Trainee





## **Executive Summary**

On July 9, 2017, CAL FIRE Fresno Kings Unit (FKU) became engaged in the Garza Incident (CA-FKU-009755), a rapidly expanding wildland fire in the foothills west of Coalinga, California, that involved State Responsibility Area (SRA) and was State DPA.

In the morning of July 10, 2017 CAL FIRE Incident Management Team 2 (Patterson) was activated to the Garza Incident, with a reporting time of 1700 hours to the location of the Coalinga High School. The Coalinga High School would also serve as the Incident Base and Incident Command Post (ICP) for the duration of the incident. The transition briefing occurred that afternoon at 1700 hours with CAL FIRE Incident Management Team 2 assuming command of the Garza Incident at 1800 hours that same day.

It was determined early on into the incident that ground resources (engines and crews) would not be available due to numerous other fires within the State. The resource drawdown along with steep and rugged topography, inaccessibility, fuel types (tall grass, brush and timber), and drought stressed fuels combined with wind caused the fire to be resistant to direct suppression efforts. These factors and conditions, along with local fire history, resulted in the decision to implement indirect line building and firing out to maximize fire suppression efforts while ensuring firefighter safety.

The Garza transition was set for 0900 on Tuesday, July 18, 2017. However, in the early afternoon of July 17, 2017 CAL FIRE Fresno Kings Unit responded to the Park Fire (CA-FKU-10248), which also was a rapidly expanding wildland fire in the foothills west of Coalinga, California. Due to the proximity of this new fire to the Garza Fire, IMT2 was asked to stay in place and assist the Unit on the 1,607-acre extended attack fire. This resulted in IMT2 staying in place until July 22, 2017 when the Garza Incident was completed and the Park Incident was in final mop up stages.

## **Fire Environment**


The Garza Incident was in Fresno, Kings and Monterey Counties, California. Nearby landmarks include State Highway 41 to the south, the community of Coalinga to the north, the community of Parkfield, along the San Andreas Fault to the west and State Hwy 33 to the east. The fire origin lies at approximately 35.89915° N / -123.26326° W (WFDSS). Elevations in the fire area range from 900 feet to 4200 feet, with average slopes 40% and greater. The involved U.S.G.S. 7.5 minute quads are Coalinga, Cholame Valley, Curry Mountain, Garza peak and Kreyenhagen Hills. The major topographical feature within the incident is the Diablo Range, running from northwest to southeast. Topography in the area of the fire was dominated by steep and rugged drainages. The area ownership of lands effected included State Responsibility Area (SRA – 44,115 acres) and Bureau of Land Management (BLM – 4,118 acres) lands.

The climate of the incident is a sub-humid environment with hot, dry summers and cool, dry winters. The average rainfall (Coalinga) is 7.62 inches per year. Last season the area received 17.07 inches of rain from September 1, 2016 - April 30, 2017. The Central



Valley is within proximity (10 miles) to the fire area and this large valley influences the climate in the area with thermal low development, strong winds and dense fog. The normal afternoon wind pattern is an up-valley flow. Although 2017 marks the end of a five year of drought, extremely dry conditions remain in the Central Valley area. The above-average rainfall contributed to a heavier than normal grasscrop.


The fuels are predominately annual grasses with small pockets of brush. Fuels vary by slope and elevation with the grasslands having a very light fuel loading on the southern aspects, increasing on the valley bottoms, with above-normal fuel loading. Fuels include: Russian Sage, Saltbrush, Buckwheat, Juniper, and occasional Cottonwood in the drainages. Fuels transition to small patches of Chamise, Grey Pine, and Coulter Pine at higher elevations and lesser drainages. Large stands of Live Oak and Blue Oak hardwood dominate the mid-slopes. Scott and Burgan 40 fuel models for calculations were GR4 and SH7.



The main carrier of fire spread was the grass component - through surface fire and short range spotting with fine fuels primarily contributing as a receptive bed for embers. Live fuel moistures were high enough in some brush stands to inhibit fire spread, with visible bloom remnants and full turgor in the new growth. Live fuel moisture readings from Parkfield, (last taken May 2017) were at 95 percent. The fire progressed under timber stands consuming downed 100 hour fuels, but showed very little transition to torching due to lack of abundant ladder fuels, unless wind/slope alignment occurred. Daytime fine dead fuel moisture remained in the single digits for the duration of the incident. A combination of high daytime temperatures, low humidities and limited access added to fire growth.




Historical events that may have influenced this incident are varied from natural events to decisions made by land owners. There have been six fires between 1995-2017 within or adjacent to the footprint of the Garza fire that may have some contribution to fuel loading and fire growth.



YEAR	FIRE NAME	GIS ACRES
2017	ELM	11,147
2008	COTTONWOOD	402
2008	AVENAL	945
2007	TAR	5,671
2001	TAYLOR	26
1995	TAR	127

Values at risk included homes, range land, watershed, and utility infrastructure - including PG&E 500KV high-tension power lines from Diablo Canyon that feed the 11 western states power grid and 230KV power lines that feed the central coast area; a 20" PG&E high pressure Natural Gas line that feeds Avenal State Prison; private and industrial land holdings, oil wells, solar power grids; historic/prehistoric archeological sites, and threatened and endangered species' habitat for the San Joaquin Kitfox.



Average Size	29,965
90th	89,314
70th	37,270
50th	13,721
30th	3,000
10th	416
Largest Fire	195,577

Date	Avg Acres	Min Acres	Max Acres	No Burn Days
07/09/2017	610	30	6969	89
07/10/2017	1904	34	16260	231
07/11/2017	3812	84	28772	271
07/12/2017	6160	32	35134	322
07/13/2017	8681	40	56474	358
07/14/2017	11079	38	63118	364
07/15/2017	13665	132	65422	365



Fire Spread Probability

- 80-100%
- 60-79%
- 40-59%
- 20-39%
- 5-19%
- 0.2-4.9%
- < 0.2%

Garza Degr 07/09/17  
2017 Garza Perimeter  
Analyze by Robert Cain  
CAL FIRE I.M.T. 2

**Fire Spread Probability (FSpro)**  
**Garza Incident**  
**CA FKU 009755**  
**July 16, 2017**

7 Day model run starting July 9, 2017  
1000 Fires  
No suppression efforts taken into account.









The combination of single-digit fine dead fuel moistures, high temperatures, and strong surface winds, along with a contiguous high-load fuel bed of annual grasses created perfect conditions for large fire runs. Fuel beds were extremely receptive to spot fires. The fire made substantial runs through the tall grasses, chaparral, and shrubs when winds were in alignment with the topography. Maximum spotting distances were estimated to be in the range of one-quarter of a mile from trees and shrubs, and up to one-half mile from a wind driven fire in annual grasses. Torching Juniper trees spread fire through radiant and convective heat and secondarily through spotting from ember cast. Within the fire scar, consumption was nearly complete in most grass beds. The brush patches created a mosaic burn pattern, depending on age, aspect, and species. The fire progressed under timber stands consuming downed 100 hour fuels, but showed very little transition to torching due to lack of abundant ladder fuels, unless wind/slope alignment occurred. Interior torching of Juniper trees and small brush stands continued to burn after firing operations were completed with little immediate threat to control lines.

A persistent large ridge of high pressure was the dominant weather feature impacting the fire area for the duration of the Garza Fire. Conditions were persistently hot and dry with variations in the diurnal, terrain driven winds the main weather change from day to day.



Factors which determine the daily wind pattern include the relative dominance of onshore westerly flow due to a marine layer present along the coast and the strength of the thermal trough in the Central Valley. Both of these factors are impacted by the strength and position of the upper level ridge (4-corners high). If the ridge is weaker or further east, onshore flow with a deepening marine layer to the west tends to dominate, bringing stronger west to southwesterly winds in the late afternoon and slightly cooler temperatures. When the ridge is more amplified and positioned further west, the thermal trough strengthens and general winds turn to the north or northeast.

During times of more dominant westerly onshore flow, southwest, up-slope/up-valley winds strengthen on the southwest side of the fire late morning through mid-afternoon and moderate to strong westerly winds can channel down aligned valleys along the northeast side of the fire in the late afternoon and early evening. During the time periods with north to northeasterly winds up-canyon winds are enhanced in northeast aligned drainages such as Jasper Canyon along the northwest side of the fire. Additionally, with the orientation of the fire and terrain relative to Central Valley and Diablo Mountains, southeasterly up-valley winds occur daily up Avenal Canyon and other similarly aligned drainages along the southeast side of the fire.









### **Initial Actions**

At 1509 hours on Sunday July 9, 2017 Fresno Kings Unit took a report of a vegetation fire west of 42154 State Highway 41 near Avenal, California. FKU ECC dispatched a high dispatch of one Battalion Chief, nine type III fire engines, two type IV fire engines, two water tenders, four type I hand crews, three bulldozers, 1 air attack, 2 air tankers, and 1 helicopter. The initial report on conditions was 10 acres of three-foot-tall grass intermixed with oak woodland at a moderate rate of spread. The control objectives were to keep the fire west of the Tar Canyon fire control road, east of Turkey Flat, south of the high-tension power lines, and north of State Highway 41.



The fire originated in Monterey County off Turkey Flat Road and burned east into Kings County. By the time initial attack resources arrived at scene the fire was established in the Little Avenal Creek drainage north of Tar Canyon Road. The fire continued to progress east towards Tar Canyon and the community of Avenal, and north towards Jacalitos Creek. The fuels transitioned into brush covered hills, with mixed conifer at mountain peaks and higher elevations.

Indirect and direct firing was conducted to establish control lines. Due to limited access for bulldozers and the rapid rate of spread of the fire along the left flank, an effective control line could not be established. Efforts to establish an anchor point were limited until additional resources arrived early in the morning of July 10 where they could begin establishing control lines from Tar Canyon Road and progressing north towards Division R and southwest from Division A at Avenal Creek.

Early in the incident the fire exhibited a moderate rate of spread with short range spotting in the annual grasses and brush. As the weather conditions changed and the fire became established in heavy brush, long range spotting and dangerous rates of spread were observed. Throughout the first night the fire traveled over 6 miles from west to east and during this initial operational period the temperatures increased from 87 degrees to 101 degrees by 2200 hours. Winds increased to 5 to 8 miles per hour and gusts up to 18 miles per hour with the humidity dropping from 17 to 12 percent. The fire grew from approximately 600 to over 9000 acres after air resources departed the incident through the morning of July 10.

Considerations for requesting a CAL FIRE Incident Management Team included multiple county jurisdictions, multiple CAL FIRE Units, limited resources due to statewide drawdown, limited access, and logistically supporting the likely resource needs.

### **Major Incident Transition**

CAL FIRE Incident Management Team 2 was on hard cover status due to the many other fires throughout the State and two other CAL FIRE IMT's assigned to two of those fires. At 1000 hours on the morning of Monday, July 10, 2017, CAL FIRE IMT 2 was activated to this incident. An activation conference call was held and the subsequent conference calls to detail the incident needs.

At 1700 hours on Monday July 10, 2017 a transition meeting was held at Coalinga High School. At 1800 hours on this date the Garza Incident transitioned from the Fresno Kings Unit to CAL FIRE Incident Management Team 2.

Incident base was established at Coalinga High School in the city of Coalinga prior to the IMT's arrival. The location of the high school provides good transportation and support opportunities for the incident base as well as substantial locations for administrative and logistical efforts to support the incident. A staging area was



established at the ICP during the incident.

**Incident Summary by Operational Period**

**Initial Attack – Sunday, July 9, 2017**

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
Engines	23	80
Hand Crews	4	63
Dozers	10	26
Water Tenders	3	6
Aircraft	5	24
Totals	23	186

On July 9<sup>th</sup> when the Garza fire started the area was underneath the influence of the very strong upper level ridge bringing very hot and dry conditions.

	Max T (°F)	Min T (°F)	Min RH (%)	Max RH (%)
Kettleman Hills 810 ft	102	82	10	24
Parkfield 1525 ft	105	63	11	47
Cal Fire 43 2729 ft	101	83	12	27

**Day 2 – Monday, July 10, 2017**

After the transition the Operations Section inserted Team night operations staff for supervision assistance and to keep the Operations Section intact for the next operational period. Night Operations Section Chief continued to implement the earlier established plan by the Unit incident organization.

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
Engines	23	80
Hand Crews	4	63
Dozers	15	39
Water Tenders	4	8
Aircraft	7	22
Totals	53	212

The upper level ridge began shifting east as an upper trough swung into the Pacific Northwest beginning a gradual increase in southwesterly flow and slight cooling in temperatures.

	Max T (°F)	Min T (°F)	Min RH (%)	Max RH (%)
Kettleman Hills 810 ft	102	83	19	33
Parkfield 1525 ft	99	62	21	56
Cal Fire 43 2729 ft	100	81	15	27

**Day 3 – Tuesday, July 11, 2017**



With input from FKU personnel a plan was developed to build control lines in favorable terrain and fuels types which would reduce the requirement of ground resources in consideration of the statewide drawdown. Consideration was given to reduce the amount of grazing land impacted by fire suppression actions and a large containment area (approx. 55,000 acres) was established. This would keep the incident within the control objectives. Two branches (I and IV) and 6 divisions were established. Divisions A, a portion of F, U, and Z were in mop up mode already. Division K used dozers to stop the fire from impacting main transmission lines. Division R completed dozers line to the 2017 Elm Fire and the other division resources carried fire along the dozer line to keep pace with main fire moving to the west.

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
Engines	44	175
Hand Crews	8	126
Dozers	15	39
Water Tenders	13	26
Aircraft	10	22
Totals	90	388

With a deepening marine layer along the coast, the west to southwesterly late afternoon wind push across the fire area was quite strong. An eye level peak of 51 mph west northwest winds were measured in the narrow-channeled terrain of Oak Canyon around 1800 as the wind surge pushed in. Elsewhere the westerly push brought winds of 10 to 15 mph with gusts of 20 to 25 mph.

	Max T (°F)	Min T (°F)	Min RH (%)	Max RH (%)
Kettleman Hills 810 ft	100	79	19	29
Parkfield 1525 ft	97	59	21	62
Cal Fire 43 2729 ft	100	77	13	28

#### **Day 4 – Wednesday, July 12, 2017**

Branch I - Divisions A, F and K were combined into one. Line construction was completed in Division L. Line scouting and construction continued in Division M. Edge firing started around 1700 and progressed past DP 10 in Division L. Structure defense measures were taken throughout the fire. Helitack crews were deployed into the interior fire area to prepare multiple cabins and a plan was established with the helicopter coordinator to protect them with aircraft.

Branch IV - Division U and Z were combined and both went to patrol status. Dozer line construction was completed to DP 18 in Division Q. An edge firing operation started around 1700 in order to stay ahead of the main fire in Division R and portions of Division Q. Division Q scouted the line up into Jasper Creek.

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
Engines	56	202
Hand Crews	13	223



Dozers	25	64
Water Tenders	7	14
Aircraft	10	26
Totals	111	529

There was a slight strengthening in the upper level ridge but overall little change in the weather pattern. Terrain driven winds continue to dominate with a shift to SW to NW (depending on terrain orientation) winds in the afternoon from west to east across the fire area.

	Max T (°F)	Min T (°F)	Min RH (%)	Max RH (%)
Kettleman Hills 810 ft	97	73	19	32
Parkfield 1525 ft	98	53	14	68
Cal Fire 43 2729 ft	96	75	17	31

### **Day 5 – Thursday, July 13, 2017**

Branch I - Firing operations in Division L were completed to DP 15. A crew strike team leader's vehicle rolled on its side and the driver suffered minor injuries. Division M continued with line construction into Jasper Creek in preparation for a firing operation. Divisions A/F/K continued with mop up and patrol operations and worked on cutting out a green island in Division K. A fire suppression repair plan was developed and began in Division R and U/Z.

Branch IV - Firing operations began in Division R and were carried through Division Q to Hell's Gate in Jasper Canyon. By morning the line was black and minimal mop-up needed. Division R and Division U/Z remained in patrol status with back haul occurring. A grader began road repair in the branch. A fire suppression repair plan was developed and began in Divisions A and F

Contingency Branch - Contingency branch resources identified dozer line locations and began line construction from Mustang Ranch Road to Jacalitos Creek.

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
Engines	69	257
Hand Crews	10	169
Dozers	28	70
Water Tenders	11	22
Aircraft	13	32
Totals	131	550

The weather pattern remains the same as the 12<sup>th</sup>. Very warm and dry with typical diurnal wind pattern.

	Max T (°F)	Min T (°F)	Min RH (%)	Max RH (%)
Kettleman Hills 810 ft	98	77	21	36
Parkfield 1525 ft	97	56	13	68



Cal Fire 43 2729 ft	99	76	11	34
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**Day 6 – Friday, July 14, 2017**

Branch I - Direct line construction around an island of brush continued in Division K. Division L continued with mop up. A firing operation began at DP 15 in Division M and was completed to Jasper Creek around 1800. Copter 406 used its plastic sphere device (PSD) to assist the main fire backing into Jasper Creek. By night fall the fire had backed into Jasper creek and was holding at morning time.

Branch IV - Fire suppression repair continued in Divisions R and U/Z. Back haul of equipment started in all areas on the branch. Division Q initiated mop up operations in Jasper Creek with helicopter support and completed a secondary line.

Contingency Branch - Resources completed dozer line from Mustang Ranch Road to Jacalitos Creek.

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
Engines	56	210
Hand Crews	13	223
Dozers	23	56
Water Tenders	13	30
Aircraft	14	26
Totals	119	545

Upper level ridge strengthening with general winds lightening and shifting to the north to northeast. Temperatures increasing and RHs lowering.

	Max T (°F)	Min T (°F)	Min RH (%)	Max RH (%)
Kettleman Hills 810 ft	100	75	20	38
Parkfield 1525 ft	101	56	9	60
Cal Fire 43 2729 ft	97	75	21	36

**Day 7 – Saturday, July 15, 2017**

Branch I - Combined Division L with Division A/F/K. Direct line construction continued in Division K around the brush field near the power line. During the afternoon 2 inmates suffered injuries. One inmate was transported by ground and the other was extricated by hoist and transported by air to the hospital. Division M continued to improve line and mop up. Fire suppression repair continued in all divisions.

Branch IV - Division R/U/Z remained in patrol status with fire suppression repair occurring throughout the division. Division Q continued to coordinate with Division M on strengthening Jasper Creek and mop up progressed throughout that area.

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
Engines	50	187
Hand Crews	10	169



Dozers	21	50
Water Tenders	13	28
Aircraft	8	20
Totals	92	454

Hot and dry with the ridge overhead. A few more clouds moved through midday than were expected and these kept highs down somewhat from their maximum potential but it was still quite hot.

	Max T (°F)	Min T (°F)	Min RH (%)	Max RH (%)
Kettleman Hills 810 ft	100	77	17	34
Parkfield 1525 ft	103	58	12	58
Cal Fire 43 2729 ft	94	79	18	32

### **Day 8 – Sunday, July 16, 2017**

Branch I - Direct line construction in Division K around the island of unburned fuel. Division M implemented mop-up operation and back haul of suppression equipment.

Branch IV - Combine Division Q into Division R/U/Z. Resources continued with mop-up and patrol in all divisions. Road and fireline suppression repair continued.

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
Engines	30	110
Hand Crews	8	136
Dozers	9	26
Water Tenders	13	26
Aircraft	4	16
Totals	64	314

Some mid-level tropical moisture creeping around the west side of the ridge in the southerly flow, brought some clouds and nearby virga showers to the area first thing in the morning but otherwise another hot and dry day.

	Max T (°F)	Min T (°F)	Min RH (%)	Max RH (%)
Kettleman Hills 810 ft	102	81	17	30
Parkfield 1525 ft	105	105	12	46
Cal Fire 43 2729 ft	101	81	8	24

### **Day 9 – Monday, July 17, 2017**

Branch I and IV were combined and divisions were condensed into three. Planning and preparation started in anticipation of transitioning the fire back the Unit.

Fire suppression repair continued with an anticipation completion date of Friday July 21, 2017.

	Total Resources	Total Personnel
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Engines	20	70
Hand Crews	6	102
Dozers	7	19
Water Tenders	9	18
Aircraft	2	6
Totals	44	215

As of this writing, the weather forecast is predicted to be a little cooler however there is a possibility of increasing westerly winds in the afternoon and evening. It will be warm, dry and mostly sunny. The highs are predicted to be 99-104 in the valleys to the lower 90s on the peaks and ridges. Minimum relative humidity will be 11 to 14%. Monday night the lows will be in the mid-70s with maximum relative humidity 35-40%, but around 25% mid-slope.

### **Air Operations Summary**

#### Fixed Wing

Date	Flight Hours	Flight Cost	Gallons	Cost per Gallon
7/9	2.47	\$18,734.59	15,527	\$3.78
7/10	50.87	\$405,693.12	167,340	\$5.10
7/11	34.8	\$82,671.51	24,530	\$6.19
7/12	7.41	\$9,489.17	3,040	\$6.20
7/13	11.05	\$40,960.38	16,964	\$5.40
7/14	5.8	\$10,469.80	2,027	\$8.44
Totals	112.4	\$568,018.57	229,428	\$5.85

#### Helicopter

Date	Flight Hours	Flight Cost	Gallons	Costs per Gallon
7/9	3.1	\$6,942.89	2,880	\$2.41
7/10	23.4	\$80,096.72	28,500	\$2.81
7/11	36.1	\$230,750.3	110,085	\$2.09
7/12	66.3	\$342,899.5	145,394	\$2.35
7/13	60.3	\$367,375.3	81,980	\$4.48
7/14	70.3	\$449,272.6	195,883	\$2.29
7/15	49.4	\$316,693.2	184,100	\$1.72
Totals	308.9	\$1,794,030	748,822	\$2.59





### **Estimated Incident Costs**

Day	Date	Cost per Day	Cost to Date	Acres to Date
1	7/9/17	\$1,143,000	\$1,143,000	5,000
2	7/10/17	\$1,800,295	\$2,943,295	12,000
3	7/11/17	\$2,086,910	\$5,030,205	16,500
4	7/12/17	\$2,034,053	\$7,064,258	23,083
5	7/13/17	\$2,164,359	\$9,228,617	39,214
6	7/14/17	\$2,117,615	\$11,340,232	48,233
7	7/15/17	\$1,892,268	\$13,238,500	48,233
8	7/16/17	\$1,600,000	\$14,838,500	48,233
9	7/17/17	\$1,000,000	\$15,838,500	48,233
10	7/18-20/17	\$600,000	\$16,438,500	48,233
Day	Date	Cost per Day	Cost to Date	Acres to Date

Total Projected Incident Cost \$16,438,500

### **Command and General Staff**

#### **Safety Officer**

The Safety staff assumed safety responsibilities for the Garza Incident after the transition. IMT2 Safety Officers briefed with the Fresno Kings Unit and formulated a seamless transition plan, which included using one of their SOFRs to assist through the incident.

There was little large fire history for this area along with limited resources including Safety Officers, to help mitigate that orders for Line Safety Officers were placed in the early stages of the incident. Some of the results of these challenges resulted in the Safety Unit working to mitigate fatigue, heat related issues, along with staying engaged while providing for safety first.

The Medical Unit (MEDL) provided good coverage with line medic teams and an ALS ambulance on the incident. The MERT established an in-camp medical unit for the treatment of all personnel assigned to the incident.

As of the time of this report the Garza Incident has recorded zero 209 reportable injuries, twelve other injuries, and one accident. The number of injuries and accidents for this complexity of an incident was low for the duration of the incident considering the number of personnel assigned as well as the number of acres burned in challenging terrain. This was a direct reflection of the dedication and professionalism of all personnel assigned to the task at hand.



Operations developed a good plan with Logistics to help mitigate the long travel distances and times between base camp in Coalinga to the fire line. The plan helped provide more rest and recovery of the line personnel that were affected by providing breakfasts and hotel vouchers out on the line at a designated drop point where personnel ate, got their hotel accommodations, and then could go straight from the fire line to their hotels.

### **Public Information Officer**

IMT2 PIO staff arrived prior to the 1700 transition meeting and met with the FKU PIO. The Unit PIO had an excellent grasp of the current situation and gave a great briefing. She agreed to stay with Team 2 through the transition period and into the next day and helped create an initial fact sheet, which was released at 1800 hours.

PIO had a small staff which handled all PIO functions including staffing a 24-hour Information/Media phone line, fact sheet updates, creating and maintaining a trap line in affected communities around the fire, conducting media interviews, and providing VIP tours. There were also contingency plans in place in case the PIO activity level would have increased.

The Unit's PIO handling of this vital function prior to our arrival, the early arrival of Team 2 PIOs and having quality personnel assigned to the PIO function helped with making it go very smoothly on this incident.

### **Liaison Officer**

IMT 2 Liaison Officers responded to the incident and immediately began reaching out and establishing contact information and relationships with the incident cooperators and assisting agencies. Incident priorities and objectives were established and sensitive and critical areas were identified including privately owned land and BLM property.

Prior to the transition with Team 2, an evacuation warning was in place for five structures in the Lost Hills area. The Liaisons met with Fresno County Sheriff's Office representatives to ensure the warning area and road concerns were valid. As the fire progressed, Kings and Monterey County Sheriff's Office were contacted and agency representatives were identified.

Throughout the incident, 29 cooperators/stakeholders were identified. The Unit's strong relationship with local cooperators and assisting agencies made the transition into this incident seamless.

There was a high degree of cooperation throughout the incident by Team Liaisons, Agency Representatives and Cooperators. The positive attitude and professionalism of all involved was instrumental in the success of the team's performance.



## **Operations Section Chief**

When IMT 2 assumed command on the evening of July 10<sup>th</sup>. The ICS structure of the incident consisted of 2 branches and 8 divisions with a maximum of 6 divisions being staffed at one time. Integration of a local Battalion Chief and Assistant Chief into the operations was accomplished and assisted with developing incident strategies. Utilizing FKU personnel added local knowledge and enhanced operational continuity.

The incident suppression strategy was developed by considering values at risk, location of the incident and resource availability. Considering those three factors control lines were placed where the terrain and fuels made containment achievable.

## **Planning Section Chief**

Functions within the Planning Section began to arrive early on Monday afternoon. By the time of the transition meeting all Unit Leaders had arrived. A brief combined strategy and planning meeting was held directly following the transition meeting and the section worked late into the night and early morning preparing products to be ready for the first Operational Briefing by IMT2 on Tuesday morning.

InciNet and both a clerical support and GIS trailer with support personnel were all successfully activated and proved critical to meet management and control objectives for this incident. CAL FIRE InciNet personnel continue to perform at an exceptionally high performance level worthy of note. The delay of the InciNet trailer arriving at 2200 hours slowed the implementation of the program, however the IT staff were able to have it in place by 0300 hours on July 11<sup>th</sup>. A NIROPS IR flight was ordered and the information arrived early in the morning of the 11<sup>th</sup> and the GIS staff produced a quality product and functioned very well considering they did so with limited available personnel.

The IMT 2 Training Specialist successfully processed 87 trainees in various assignments in all 5 ICS functions. As of this writing, of those who have demobilized off the incident, 30 percent have been recommended for full qualification and 70 percent will require additional assignments to complete their Position Task Books. Out of the 87 trainees, 15 were priority trainees. 40 percent of priority trainees completed their Task Books, while the other 60 percent increased their Task Book completion percentages in at least some of the subject areas.

## **Logistics Section Chief**

The base camp was set up at Coalinga High School with the assistance of the local Unit logistics staff. The base camp was large enough to handle the incident needs with room to expand and the use of classrooms in the facility was critical in allowing team functions to quickly set up, as trailers where is high demand, with restricted availability due to draw down by other fires.



Local Unit personnel secured the base camp location with an existing agreement in place and Miramonte Kitchen was set up prior to IMT 2 arrival. At the peak of the Incident the Miramonte MKU served 1,280 meals with a total of 10,750 meals served. On day 5 of the incident IMT 2 Logistics staff were able to secure the use of West Hills College Dormitory for incident logging.

The staff successfully overcame some challenges including base camp restrictions, limited motels, radio system challenges, and being unable to fill critical positions due to draw down. Overcoming those and other challenges, the Logistics Section was able to continue to support the incident.

### **Finance Section Chief**

All Units in the Finance Section were actively involved in supporting this incident. The Time Unit collected personnel time documents from cooperating agencies, processed eFC-33's for CAL FIRE employees, and prepared payment documents for hired equipment vendors. The Cost Unit prepared the cost estimate and transmitted the information to Sacramento Headquarters. The Procurement Unit prepared facility use agreements, including the Base Camp (Coalinga High School and West Hills College), Helibase (Coalinga Airport), and others. In addition, the Procurement Unit prepared payment documents for food served by the MKU, sack lunches, fuel, and other commodities used by the incident. The Comps/Claims unit processed 11 comp cases and 17 claims.

Following the transition of the incident back to the Fresno Kings Unit, the Finance Section will complete the incident closeout process. In the event of a team redeployment, the Section has a plan in place to continue to support the Unit with incident closeout.

### **Incident Commander Comments**

An aggressive initial attack effort, along with clear and concise expectations from the local Unit, assisted in the successful and efficient transition of the incident to CAL FIRE Incident Management Team 2.

It was determined early on into the incident that ground resources (engines and crews) would not be available due to numerous other fires within the State, along with steep and rugged topography, inaccessibility, fuel types (tall grass, brush and timber), and drought stressed fuels combined with wind caused the fire to be resistant to direct suppression efforts. These factors and conditions, along with local fire history resulted in the decision to implement indirect line building and firing out to maximize fire suppression efforts while ensuring firefighter safety.

CAL FIRE Incident Management Team 2 transitioned the Garza Incident back to the Fresno Kings Unit at 0900 hours on Saturday, July 22, 2017.