



Leadership is Action!

Battle of Shiloh Southern Region Staff Ride 18-21 October 2011

In February of 1862, the Confederate States of America outposted and patrolled an extensive “fireline” along their northwest boundary. With “ignition” on February 6th at Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, a moderate-size “fire” made a strong run towards Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River about 12 miles to the East. By February 16th 15,000 confederate fighters were entrapped. There were three largely co-equal confederate “incident commanders” leading the resources at Fort Donelson – Confederate Brigadiers John Floyd, Gideon Pillow, and Simon Bolivar Buckner.

How does this historic scenario relate to the South Canyon Fire of 1994? Are there some similarities in leadership and command relationships that we can learn from?

One of the mid-level confederate leaders in 1862, Nathan Bedford Forrest, refused orders to “deploy shelters” and be burned over. “Old Bedford” sent forward lookouts, and stayed in communication with them; he determined escape routes, and successfully followed those routes to safety zones. Forrest devised an innovative escape plan and led others to safety. Most of his men followed him – but some refused and did not. Why was that? In 1949 at Mann Gulch, Wagner Dodge devised an innovative escape plan too, but no one followed him into the escape fire.

What techniques do you use as a leader to build unit cohesion? How do you gain and maintain trust relationships between all those entrusted to your care? How do you personally prepare to lead your organizations through perilous situations to safety? Are you prepared to clearly and effectively communicate your intent to others in a fluid and dynamic environment? How much will you personally sacrifice to protect those in your charge?

Over the course of three full days in October, we invite you to share your ideas on leadership at the battleground around Shiloh Church. Here in April of 1862, roughly 100,000 Americans faced desperate peril on the banks of the Tennessee River. Put yourself in the place of their leaders as we visit the locations where key decisions were made. Practice with your discussion groups the art of **communicating** as receivers by sensing the reports and conditions, **understanding** the desperate situation you face, **deciding** what to do, and **communicating** your decisions in order to effect action.

The leaders involved in this major 1862 incident were all real folks – just like us – who found themselves leading their organizations through violent uncertain circumstances that unfolded very rapidly. They communicated, understood, decided, and then communicated their decisions into action – just like we must do. Using this major historical incident as a setting, we gather our wildfire leaders to discuss leadership techniques relevant to incident management in the 21st century, and the responsibility we bear for our Nation. Thank you in advance for your meaningful participation in this event.



Remembrances of a Private and a Captain – 6 April 1862



"Those savage yells, and the sight of thousands of racing figures coming towards them, discomfited the blue-coats; and when we arrived upon the place where they had stood, they had vanished. Then **we caught sight of their beautiful array of tents, before which they had made their stand**, after being roused from their Sunday-morning sleep, and huddled into line, at hearing their pickets challenge our skirmishers. The half-dressed dead and wounded showed what a surprise our attack had been. After being exposed for a few seconds to this fearful downpour, we heard the order to 'Lie down, men, and continue your firing!' Before me was a prostrate tree, about fifteen inches in diameter, with a narrow strip of light between it and the ground. Behind this shelter a dozen of us flung ourselves. The security it appeared to offer restored me to my individuality. We could fight, and think, and observe, better than out in the open. But it was a terrible period! How the cannon bellowed, and their shells plunged and bounded, and flew with screeching hisses over us! Their sharp rending explosions and hurtling fragments made us shrink and cower, despite our utmost efforts to be cool and collected. I marveled, as I heard the unintermitting patter, snip, thud, and hum of the bullets, how anyone could live under this raining death. I could hear the balls beating a merciless tattoo on the outer surface of the log, pinging vivaciously as they flew off at a tangent from it, and thudding into something or other, at the rate of a hundred a second. One, here and there, found its way under the log, and buried itself in a comrade's body."

Private Henry Morton Stanley
6th Arkansas Infantry






"The position between the tents was manifestly untenable. The Colonel was still very much excited and seemingly in no condition to receive suggestions, so I sought Lieutenant-Colonel Parker and gave him my view of the situation. He agreed with me, but unfortunately these two officers were at outs and had not spoken with each other in several days. The Major was absent, so the necessity devolved upon me, as Acting Adjutant to, at least consult with the Colonel. Approaching him with in a conciliatory tone I remarked: "this position between the tents does not seem tenable. Had you not better retire the regiment to higher ground across the ravine in our rear. You will still be practically in line with the 70th and also with the 72nd which is already across the ravine?" "I was ordered to conform with the 70th and form a new line on the Purdy road. Here I am going to stay until ordered back by competent authority". The Colonel was right about conforming, but wrong about the road, for the one upon which he stood was only a spur leading into the Purdy. Just then the 70th showed signs of retiring. Things looked desperate, for the 'rebs' were not only showing themselves above the hill in our front but, having dissipated Hildebrand's Brigade to the left of the chapel, were appearing on the left front of the 70th. Again approaching the Lieutenant-Colonel I suggested that he give the command to retire. "The Colonel is in command" was his reply. Then here gos and I yelled: "Attention 48th. About face, guide center, March!" The Colonel, frantic with rage, rushed along the line, exclaiming: "Show me the man who gave that order. I'll cut his head off!" Years afterwards, in New York, I met Col. Sullivan and while his guest at dinner, at the old Metropolitan Hotel on Broadway, I asked him if he had ever discovered who it was that gave the order to retire from between the tents at Shiloh. "I had a suspicion at the time that it was you, I realized after the battle that, under the existing conditions, it was the one thing to do, and I believe now that the move saved the regiment from possible annihilation - certainly from capture. Had I known, however, at the time that the order was uttered by you it is more than possible I should have you shot down".







Captain F. M. Posegate
48th Ohio Volunteer Infantry

Leaders – Good, Bad, and Ugly


Below are the principle leaders whose decisions affected the lives of men like Stanley and Posegate.

| Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio | | Army of Mississippi | |
|--|---|---|---|
| Ulysses S. Grant (born Hiram Ulysses Grant ; April 27, 1822 – July 23, 1885) – Commanding Army of the Tennessee. Age at Shiloh: 40 Home State: Ohio |  | Albert Sidney Johnston (February 2, 1803 – April 6, 1862) – Commanding Army of Mississippi Age at Shiloh: 59 Home State: Kentucky |  |
| Don Carlos Buell (March 23, 1818 – November 19, 1898) – Commanding Army of the Ohio Age at Shiloh: 44 Home State: Ohio |  | Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard (May 28, 1818 – February 20, 1893) – Commander and Deputy Commander, Army of Mississippi Age at Shiloh: 44 Home State: Louisiana |  |
| John Alexander McClernand (May 30, 1812 – September 20, 1900) – Commanding 1 st Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 50 Home State: Illinois |  | Leonidas Polk (April 10, 1806 – June 14, 1864) – Commanding First confederate corps. Age at Shiloh: 56 Home State: North Carolina |  |
| Lewis "Lew" Wallace (April 10, 1827 – February 15, 1905) – Commanding 3 rd Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 35 Home State: Indiana |  | Braxton Bragg (March 22, 1817 – September 27, 1876) – Commanding Second confederate corps. Age at Shiloh: 45 Home State: North Carolina |  |
| William Hervey Lamme Wallace (July 8, 1821 – April 10, 1862) – Commanding 2 nd Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 41 Home State: Ohio |  | William Joseph Hardee (October 12, 1815 – November 6, 1873) – Commanding Third confederate corps Age at Shiloh: 47 Home State: Georgia |  |
| Benjamin Mayberry Prentiss (November 23, 1819 – February 8, 1901) – Commanding 6 th Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 39 Home State: Virginia |  | John Cabell Breckinridge (January 16, 1821 – May 17, 1875) – Commanding Fourth confederate corps Age at Shiloh: 41 Home State: Kentucky |  |
| William Tecumseh Sherman (February 8, 1820 – February 14, 1891) – Commanding 5 th Division, Army of the Tennessee Age at Shiloh: 42 Home State: Ohio |  | Nathan Bedford Forrest (July 13, 1821 – October 29, 1877) – Commanding Tennessee Cavalry Regiment Age at Shiloh: 41 Home State: Tennessee |  |


The Organizations and Common Military Unit Map Symbols

| Unit Symbol | Description and Analogy |
|--|---|
|  <p style="text-align: center;">Army</p> | <p>An Army (XXXX) operates with near-complete independence, charged to integrate all the elements of national power (military, economic, political, and informational) into its actions. It is commanded by a General, and can be thought of as analogous to Area Command. Three Armies fought at Shiloh – the Army of the Tennessee (Federal about 50,000 strong) the Army of the Ohio (Federal about 20,000 strong) and the Army of Mississippi (Confederate about 48,000 strong).</p> |
|  <p style="text-align: center;">Corps</p> | <p>A Corps (XXX) operates as part of an Army, but is often assigned to conduct independent operations. It is commanded by a Lieutenant General, and generally has a “combined arms” force of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and logistics. It is analogous to Incident Command controlling all resources. Federal Corps were typically smaller organizations of about 12,000 men; Confederate Corps typically larger at around 25,000. At Shiloh the Federal Armies were not yet organized into Corps, while the Confederate Army was (4 Corps of about only 12,000 each)</p> |
|  <p style="text-align: center;">Division</p> | <p>A Division (XX) is a specialized unit of about 6,000 men that operates as part of a Corps. Commanded by a Major General. The symbol to the left shows an Infantry Division depicted with “crossed rifles” in the box in the form of an X. A Division is responsible for a part of the Corps’ fighting line, and can be thought of the same way as a Division on an extended attack fire.</p> |
|  <p style="text-align: center;">Brigade</p> | <p>A Brigade (X) is a specialized subset of a Division, generally with about 1,000 men. Commanded by a Brigadier General or a Colonel. The symbol to the left shows a Cavalry Brigade depicted with one “drawn saber” (a slash “/”) to show that it’s cavalry.</p> |
|  <p style="text-align: center;">Regiment</p> | <p>A Regiment (III) is a specialized subset of a Brigade, generally with about 500 men, although technically it should consist of 10 companies of infantry, with each company having 100 men. Commanded by a Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel. The symbol to the left shows an Infantry Regiment.</p> |
|  <p style="text-align: center;">Battalion</p> | <p>A Battalion (II) is generally used as an organization of artillery batteries – and in rare instances a grouping of infantry companies within a Regiment. Commanded by a Major. The symbol to the left shows an Artillery Battalion with a cannon-ball in the middle. Cavalry would use the term “squadron” in place of “battalion” for multiple “troops” of cavalry later in the war.</p> |

**Federal
Forces at Shiloh**



Confederate Forces at Shiloh



Resume Summaries for Retired U.S. Marine Facilitators from OMNA International, LLC

| Name | Experience and Qualifications |
|--|--|
| <p style="text-align: center;">Eric Carlson</p> | <p>Experience: 33 years — Retired U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel. Director of Operations for Marine Corps University and Director of the Commanding General's Civil War Staff Ride Program 1999-2003. Chief of Plans, 2d Marine Division for the intervention to prevent genocide in Kosovo. Planned and executed staff rides for Division commanders and staff to Belen Pass Turkey, Shenandoah Valley, and Vicksburg. Assisted National Interagency Fire Center develop nationwide leadership development program, and led staff rides for Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, and Storm King Mountain for National Incident Management Organizations, Incident Command Teams, and Interagency Hotshot Teams. Infantry Officer Course instructor. Combat veteran of Beirut and Kuwait. L-580 Gettysburg faculty member.</p> <p>Education and Qualifications: Master of Military Studies, Marine Corps University; Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History, Upsala College; Distinguished Graduate of Marine Corps Command and Staff College.</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">J.D. Baker</p> | <p>Experience: 24 years — Retired U.S. Marine Master Sergeant. Staff Noncommissioned Officer in Charge of Schools, Weapons Training Battalion, Quantico. Chief instructor U.S. Marine Corps Scout Sniper Instructor School. Extensive Marine Special Operations experience in the operations and logistics of motorized helicopterborne forces with supporting equipment and fires from amphibious shipping. Provided training and certification for Federal Bureau of Investigation Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Provided support to United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the testing and evaluation of arms and equipment. Planned and executed overnight leadership exercises along the Appalachian Trail. L-580 Gettysburg faculty member.</p> <p>Education and Qualifications: Honorary Graduate, U.S. Naval Academy. Certified in curriculum development and systems approach to training. Certified in Operational Risk Management.</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Dex Conrad</p> | <p>Experience: 23 years – Retired U.S. Marine First Sergeant. Senior Instructor, U.S. Marine Corps antiarmor weapon systems. Combat veteran of Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. Senior Instructor, II Marine Expeditionary Force convoy operations. Company First Sergeant, The Basic School. Staff Non Commissioned Officer In Charge, United States Shooting Team. Advanced Firearms Techniques Training Course, FBI National Academy, Double Distinguished Marksman, National and International Rifle and Pistol Champion and World Record Holder. L-580 Gettysburg faculty member.</p> <p>Education and Qualifications: Advanced Staff Non Commissioned Officer Academy, First Sergeant/Sergeant Major Course. Certified as an Instructional Systems Developer. Lean Six Sigma certified.</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Craig Huddleston</p> | <p>Experience: 42 years – Retired U.S. Marine Colonel. Chief of Staff Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa – 2004-2005. As Director, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, hosted participation by numerous wildland fire seminar groups in U.S. Marine Corps staff rides at Gettysburg and the 1864 Overland Campaign. Commander, Recruit Training Regiment. Senior U.S. Marine Exchange Officer, Royal Marines. Director of Warfighting, Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Commander, 1st Bn, 3d Marines. Southeast Asia Plans Officer, U.S. Pacific Command. Director, Marine Corps Infantry Officer Course.</p> <p>Education and Qualifications: A.A. Engineering Pensacola Junior College, B.A. and M.A. in Business from National University in San Diego. Graduate of Marine Corps War College, Command and Staff College, and Amphibious Warfare School</p> |



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Shiloh Staff Ride Participant Guide



Purpose: Exercise the decision-making skills of Southern Area wildland fire leaders against the historical background of the Battle of Shiloh.

Method: Assigned participants and support cadre rendezvous their teams with transportation at the Hampton Inn in Corinth, MS. Monday and Friday are travel days. Tuesday is an opportunity to orient yourself to the battlefield on your own by driving the area. An introductory overview session is held on Tuesday evening, followed by two days of staff ride at the Shiloh Battlefield. The first morning starts with an introductory overview of staff rides, and the historical situation facing our Nation in 1861-1862. Participants then break into small-groups, each with their own senior fire and retired U.S. Marine advisors, and are issued a decision exercise to consider and discuss at the next stop. From the hotel, the three teams move using their own transportation to link-up at predetermined locations throughout the battlefield as shown in this guide.

General Timeline:

| Tuesday, 10/18/11 | | | |
|---------------------|--|---------------------|---|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 17:00 – 19:00 | Welcome | Interpretive Center | History and Leadership |
| Wednesday, 10/19/11 | | | |
| 08:00 – 09:15 | Orientation | Interpretive Center | Administrative and Historical Orientation |
| 09:15 – 10:00 | Travel to Park | Underway | Movement – LCES throughout |
| 10:00 – 10:45 | Stand 1 | Fraley Field | Assuming Command and Gathering Resources |
| 11:00 – 12:00 | Stand 1 Alpha | Shiloh Church | Leader’s Intent and Communication |
| 12:00 – 13:00 | Lunch | Picnic Area | Catered Box Lunch |
| 13:15 – 14:15 | Stand 2 | Hornet’s Nest | Making Sound and Timely Decisions |
| 14:45 – 15:30 | Stand 3 | Peach Orchard | Concentration and Mass at Decisive Point |
| 15:45 – 16:30 | Summary | Dill Branch | Consolidation, Assessment, and Preparation |
| 16:30 – 17:15 | Travel to hotel. Everyone on their own for dinner. | | |
| Thursday, 10/20/11 | | | |
| 07:30 – 08:15 | Travel to Park | Underway | Movement – Windows of Opportunity |
| 08:15 – 08:45 | Day 2 Orientation | Dill Branch | Brief Beauregard’s Orders |
| 09:00 – 09:30 | Stand 4 | Pittsburg Land | Maintaining Situational Awareness |
| 09:45 – 11:00 | Stand 5 | Grant’s Line | Anchoring Flanks |
| 11:00 – 12:00 | Lunch | Picnic Area | Catered Box Lunch |
| 12:30 – 14:00 | Stand 6 | Confederate Mon | Plan for defeat? |
| 14:15 – 15:00 | Stand 7 | Shiloh Church | A Bias for Action – Forrest at Fallen Timbers |
| 15:00 – 16:00 | Leadership | Shiloh Church | Values |
| 16:00 – 17:00 | Move and Break | Visitor Center | Personal reflection and study |
| 17:00 – 17:30 | Move to Dinner | Park to Hagy’s | Prepare for integration |
| 17:30 – 18:00 | Integration Dinner | Hagy’s Catfish | What will you now teach others? |
| 20:00 – 20:45 | Return to Hotel | Hagy’s to Hotels | Personal reflection |

Maps are provided throughout this guide for movement between battlefield locations.

At each successive battlefield location (known as a “stand”), the senior fire leadership advisor provides an orientation to the ground and begins discussion, followed with an overview of the historical situation and the U.S. Marine perspective supporting the Decision Theme for each stand.

Two themes are to be considered at all stands and throughout all movements: *Leadership and LCES*, and *Windows of Opportunity*.

Upon arrival at each stand, the senior fire advisor will generally begin the discussion with questions like these:

1. What does the theme for this stand mean to you?
2. From your preliminary study, why do you think this theme applies at this location?
3. Have you been in a similar position of leadership where this theme describes your challenge?

The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Participants will then be chosen at random to communicate their understanding and decisions for the **decision exercise** to the group by answering the following in the assigned leadership role for each exercise:

1. What is your vision for how events will unfold?
2. What are your communications?

End State > Objectives > Strategy > Tactics

Following the decision exercise and summary discussion at each stand, the decision exercise for the next stand will be issued.


Throughout, participants are encouraged to use the leadership decision cycle:

Communicate (sense and gather) > Understand > Decide > Communicate (transmit)

The final leadership discussion at 1500 on Thursday at Shiloh Church will focus on the values and principles of Integrity, Respect, and Duty.

The integration dinner will provide a forum for each participant to share one leadership lesson learned with the entire group – a lesson that you plan to teach to others in the future.





| Wednesday, 10/19/11 | | | |
|---------------------|---------|--------------|--|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 10:00 – 10:45 | Stand 1 | Fraley Field | Assuming Command and Gathering Resources |

What does the theme for this stand mean to you?

From your preliminary study, why do you think this theme applies at this location?

Have you been in a similar position of leadership where this theme describes your challenge?


Be proficient in your job, both technically and as a leader.

- Take charge when in charge.
- Adhere to professional standard operating procedures.
- Develop a plan to accomplish given objectives.

STAND 1 – Fire correlation – Assuming command of an incident, gathering resources and quickly gaining and maintaining trust relationships with the leaders of the assigned resources. Planning ahead to future operational periods. Establishing End State > Objectives > Strategy > Tactics

The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Orientation:



With the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson, the Confederate situation in the west was critical. Johnston's Confederate troops were now split; Johnston personally commanded 17,000 troops in the vicinity of Nashville facing Buell's 50,000 Union troops. Beauregard had 21,000 troops spread out from Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth, Mississippi, facing 40,000

troops under Grant and 25,000 under Pope. Something had to be done or all of Tennessee would be lost, and Mississippi and Alabama would be threatened.

Richmond authorities decided to reinforce Johnston's department. MG Braxton Bragg was ordered to reinforce middle Tennessee with 10,000 of his troops guarding the seacoast. BG Daniel Ruggles was ordered to come from Louisiana with 5,000 troops. Beauregard ordered Polk and his 17,000 troops to abandon Columbus and move to Corinth. Additionally, Johnston determined that he had to abandon the cordon defense and concentrate his troops. He selected Corinth as the point of concentration. Corinth was a critical rail hub where the east-west Memphis and Charleston Railroad crossed the north-south Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Johnston considered its defense to be critical for the Confederacy. Johnston ordered Beauregard to command the troops west of the Tennessee River while he moved his forces from Nashville. Nashville was abandoned by 22 February, and with it tons of badly needed provisions and supplies were lost. Johnston moved to Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and on 28 February, he started his retreat south toward Corinth.

The Confederate populace and politicians were irritated by the defeats in the west, and all of them blamed Johnston. Luckily for Johnston, President Davis was behind him. When a delegation of Tennessee politicians asked him to replace Johnston, Davis said, "If Sydney Johnston is not a general, the Confederacy has none to give you." Johnston remained in command, but many had lost faith in him.

As Beauregard withdrew forces from Columbus, he left a large garrison at Island Number 10. Island Number 10 was the most northern Confederate defensive position on the Mississippi River. Beauregard determined that as long as Island Number 10 remained a threat Union forces under Pope could not campaign against Corinth. The Confederate fort at Island Number 10 had 8,000 troops and 51 cannon. Eventually, Beauregard reduced the island's garrison to 3,500 men and told the commander, BG William Mackall, that he had to fix Pope's troops. Mackall's 3,500 men tied down Pope's 25,000 men until Island Number 10 fell on 7 April. However, the defense of Island Number 10 tied down 25,000 Union soldiers during the Battle of Shiloh.

On 11 March Lincoln issued General Order #3. The order created the Department of the Mississippi by combining the Departments of the Ohio and Missouri. Halleck was placed in command of the new department. The Department of the Ohio became the Army of the Ohio, and Smith's troops became the Army of the Tennessee. Halleck now commanded Buell's troops, and on 16 March, Halleck ordered Buell to move his troops overland to the Tennessee River.

While the Union troops moved, Johnston kept moving to Corinth. After leaving Murfreesboro on 28 February, Johnston moved his forces to Fayetteville, Tennessee, arriving on 5 March. By 10 March, part of Johnston's troops arrived at Decatur, Alabama. Johnston planned to move his forces by rail from Decatur, but the Confederate rail system was in disarray. Still under civilian control, Bragg was using most of the railcars and engines to move his troops, so Johnston only had 160 cars to move his troops. Thus, the lack of railcars hindered Johnston's efforts to concentrate his forces. The first of Johnston's troops arrived in Corinth on 19 March, but troop units stretched all the way back to Decatur. Johnston himself finally arrived in Corinth on 22 March.

The Confederate plan called for a departure at 0600 on 3 April. Hardee's corps was to lead on the Ridge Road, followed by Clark's division of Polk's corps. Polk would consolidate his corps when Cheatham came down from Purdy and linked up. Bragg would travel along the Monterey Road followed by Breckinridge. Once the Army reached a small farmhouse named Michie's, it would form for the attack. Johnston planned to attack with his four corps in successive lines. Hardee's corps would lead, followed in sequence by Bragg, Polk, and Breckinridge. The main goal of Johnston's attack was to turn Grant's left, driving the Federals away from the Tennessee River.

The Confederate movement was a debacle from the start. The streets of Corinth were so clogged that the start time was pushed back. Commanders battled among themselves for road use, which caused confusion and delay. Bragg's troops got a late start due to an error in their orders. Cheatham's division never started this day because of vague orders. Hardee's troops turned off the main road to find a bivouac location, but Polk's troops continued on the main road. It rained the night of 3 April, and the Confederates slept in the open.

On the morning of 4 April the disjointed advance continued. When Hardee's troops returned to the main road, they found Polk in the way. Much time was lost as Hardee attempted to pass Polk. The Confederates made poor time, and a

rainstorm in the afternoon again slowed the advance. By the night of 4 April the Army of the Mississippi was widely dispersed between Corinth and Michie's farmhouse. Johnston met with Beauregard, Bragg, and Breckinridge on the night of the 4th. Johnston ordered an attack on Grant's troops for the next morning at 0800.

The Confederates did not start their movement on 5 April until 0700. At 1000 Hardee's troops began to deploy into the line of battle and soon were ready to attack. Bragg was to form the next line behind Hardee, but his troops were delayed and not in position until 1600. Once Bragg was in line, Polk quickly moved into position. Cheatham's division had moved that morning and linked up with his corps. By the time the fourth line, Breckinridge's corps, was in position, it was dark.

FRALEY FIELD: COL Everett Peabody, commander, 1st Brigade, 6th Division (Prentiss) was worried about reports of a Confederate presence. Early on the evening of 5 April he debriefed a patrol from the 25th Missouri. The patrol's leader, Major James Powell, reported that he heard a large body of Confederates south of the camps. Very early on 6 April Peabody, on his own authority, ordered Powell to conduct another reconnaissance with three companies from the 25th Missouri and two companies of the 12th Michigan. At 0300 Powell formed five companies and cautiously headed south.

At approximately 0445 Powell's skirmish line entered Fraley Field. When it was partially across, a battalion of Hardee's confederate troops opened fire. Powell's men took cover on the east side of the field, and for the next 60 minutes these small units traded fire, causing minor casualties. During the fight Prentiss learned that his troops were in contact so he ordered COL David Moore to take five of his companies of the 21st Missouri (Peabody's brigade) to assist Powell.

At 0630 Powell noticed some Confederate cavalry moving to his left. Fearing he was being flanked, Powell ordered his men to withdraw. As Powell withdrew, the general Confederate advance began. Continuing his withdrawal, Powell met Moore coming up with the relief column. Moore, after berating Powell for retreating, took charge of the troops now in Seay Field. The rest of the 21st Missouri soon joined Moore along the eastern edge of Seay Field. Moore led these troops across the field, and when he was halfway across, the Confederates hidden along the west side of the field opened fire. Moore was wounded in the leg and soon ordered a retreat to the northeast corner of the field.

Communicate (sense and gather) > Understand > Decide > Communicate (transmit)

Decision Exercise 1: In the first exercise, you are Major James Powell, ordered to conduct a reconnaissance with a small force of three companies from your regiment, and two unknown companies from another regiment.

What is your vision for how events will unfold?

What are your communications to your Brigade and Regimental Commanders?

What are your communications to your company commanders?

End State > Objectives > Strategy > Tactics

Decision Exercise 1A: In the next exercise, you are P.G.T. Beauregard. It is 0300 on 6 April. You are disheartened with the progress of the Army over the past couple days. You are certain that surprise has been lost and that Sidney Johnston has made a huge mistake by ordering the attack at dawn on the 6th of April against what you know are entrenched federal troops. You tried to convince him to give up the attack, but he decided against your recommendation.

| Wednesday, 10/19/11 | | | |
|---------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 11:00 – 12:00 | Stand 1 Alpha | Shiloh Church | Leader's Intent and Communication |

What does the theme for this stand mean to you?

From your preliminary study, why do you think this theme applies at this location?

Have you been in a similar position of leadership where this theme describes your challenge?

Ensure that tasks are understood, supervised, and accomplished.

- Issue clear instructions.
- Observe and assess actions in progress without micro-managing.
- Use positive feedback to modify duties, tasks and assignments when appropriate.


STAND 1A – Fire correlation – Translating vision into clear leader's intent is at the heart of our command philosophy. Our people are empowered to exercise individual initiative and take appropriate risks and actions as the situation requires. This does not imply, however, that our actions are not coordinated. Fire leaders continually work to achieve coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly understood objective. Alignment of vision and objectives throughout all levels of the organization. Fire correlation – LCES. Are we really using lookouts effectively and adequately?

The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Orientation:

5 April was a day of reorganization in the Army of the Tennessee. Grant had decided to reorganize his army's cavalry and artillery. The reorganization occurred on 5 April. Sherman lost his detachment of the 5th Ohio Cavalry Regiment and received a detachment from the 4th Illinois Cavalry Regiment. During the daylight hours of 5 April Sherman had no cavalry because of the reorganization.

On the evening of 5 April the Confederate commanders met. Once Bragg's troops were in position, Beauregard rode up and conferred with Bragg. Both generals agreed that the Union had to know of the Confederates' presence and had to be entrenched. They thought it best to fall back to Corinth without a fight. They sent for Polk, and while Beauregard, Bragg, and Polk talked, Johnston rode up. It was 1700. Beauregard and Bragg recommended to Johnston that the Army retreat to Corinth. The reasons they stated were that they would have had to have lost surprise, the Union troops had to be entrenched, and the soldiers had eaten all of their rations. Johnston asked Polk for his opinion, and Polk recommended they attack. Breckinridge rode up and stated his corps was ready to attack. Johnston looked at the assembled generals and said, "Gentlemen, we shall attack at daylight tomorrow." The corps commanders returned to their troops. As Johnston was leaving the meeting, he turned to an aide and said, "I would fight them if they were a million."






"The position between the tents was manifestly untenable. The Colonel was still very much excited and seemingly in no condition to receive suggestions, so I sought Lieutenant-Colonel Parker and gave him my view of the situation. He agreed with me, but unfortunately these two officers were at outs and had not spoken with each other in several days. The Major was absent, so the necessity devolved upon me, as Acting Adjutant to, at least consult with the Colonel. Approaching him with in a conciliatory tone I remarked: "this position between the tents does not seem tenable. Had you not better retire the regiment to higher ground across the ravine in our rear. You will still be practically in line with the 70th and also with the 72nd which is already across the ravine?" "I was ordered to conform with the 70th

and form a new line on the Purdy road. Here I am going to stay until ordered back by competent authority". The Colonel was right about conforming, but wrong about the road, for the one upon which he stood was only a spur leading into the Purdy. Just then the 70th showed signs of retiring. Things looked desperate, for the 'rebs' were not only showing themselves above the hill in our front but, having dissipated Hildebrand's Brigade to the left of the chapel, were appearing on the left front of the 70th. Again approaching the Lieutenant-Colonel I suggested that he give the command to retire. "The Colonel is in command" was his reply. Then here gos and I yelled: "Attention 48th. About face, guide center, March!" The Colonel, frantic with rage, rushed along the line, exclaiming: "Show me the man who gave that order. I'll cut his head off!" Years afterwards, in New York, I met Col. Sullivan and while his guest at dinner, at the old Metropolitan Hotel on Broadway, I asked him if he had ever discovered who it was that gave the order to retire from between the tents at Shiloh. "I had a suspicion at the time that it was you, I realized after the battle that, under the existing conditions, it was the one thing to do, and I believe now that the move saved the regiment from possible annihilation - certainly from capture. Had I known, however, at the time that the order was uttered by you it is more than possible I should have you shot down".

Captain F. M. Posegate
48th Ohio Volunteer Infantry



On 13 March 1862 Lew Wallace and his division dispatched from transports at Crump's Landing. His original mission was to damage the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Bethel Station. Wallace had two battalions of cavalry assigned to his division. He sent the battalion from the 5th Ohio Cavalry to damage the railroad, and it eventually tore up 150 feet of trestle before returning to its camps (the Confederates repaired the damage the next day). While on the raid, the cavalry learned that there was a large Confederate force nearby, so Wallace was ordered to remain while the rest of the Army went into camp around Pittsburg Landing. Wallace disposed his troops with COL Charles Whittlesey's 3d Brigade at Adamsville, COL John Thayer's 2d Brigade at Stoney Lonesome, and COL Morgan Smith's 1st Brigade and division headquarters at Crump's Landing. Wallace was concerned because his division was isolated from the rest of the Army. Believing that any reinforcements coming to his aid would come from the end of the line (Sherman), Wallace decided to prepare the Shunpike, a small, dirt road, that ran from Sherman's camp to Stoney Lonesome. In late March Wallace had his cavalry recon and repair the Shunpike toward Sherman's camps.

At 0600, 6 April a sentinel woke Wallace and told him he heard firing to the south. Believing an attack to the south could mean a Confederate offensive, Wallace decided to concentrate his division at Stoney Lonesome in case the Confederates attacked from Purdy. He maintained a headquarters boat at Crump's Landing and moved there anticipating that orders would soon come. At 0830 Grant arrived at Crump's Landing aboard his headquarters boat, the *Tigress*. Grant did not disembark, but he moored to Wallace's boat and the two conferred across the rails of their respective boats. Grant told Wallace to be prepared to move to the south on a moment's notice. Wallace told Grant that he had already ordered his division concentrated and would wait for orders. When Grant left Wallace moved his headquarters to Stoney Lonesome. Before he departed he left a horse at Crump's Landing for any of Grant's staff officers who might arrive by boat with orders.

When Grant arrived at Pittsburg Landing and determined the seriousness of the situation, he ordered his Assistant Adjutant General Captain John Rawlins to send Chief Quartermaster Captain A.S. Baxter to Crump's Landing to order Wallace's division forward. When Rawlins gave Baxter the instructions, Baxter thought it best that orders be written, so Rawlins went on the *Tigress*, found a scrap of paper and a pencil, and drafted the orders. Baxter immediately departed on the *Tigress*, arriving at Crump's Landing at 1100. There he found the horse Wallace left and rode to Stoney Lonesome, arriving at 1130. Baxter handed the order to Wallace, who read it and said he was prepared to move. Baxter returned to the *Tigress*, and Wallace handed the order to one of his staff officers, Captain Frederick Knefler, who put it under his sword belt. Sometime during the day the orders fell out of the belt, an event that would haunt Wallace for the rest of his life.

After the battle there was a controversy about Wallace's movements to the battle. Grant and his staff officers said the order told Wallace to take "the road nearest to and parallel with the river." Wallace and his staff officers, however, said the order told them to "come up and take position on the right of the Army." Regardless, Wallace decided to move his division down the Shunpike as he had planned.

Baxter had given the order to Wallace at 1130, and after allowing his troops a quick meal (another decision drawing criticism later), Wallace was marching by 1200. Grant had expected Wallace to arrive quickly since he was only 5 miles away and throughout the day sent orderlies to hurry Wallace. One cavalry lieutenant reported that Wallace would not move unless he had written orders. Grant sent Captain W.R. Rowley of his staff to determine the situation with Wallace and to hurry him up.

Rowley found Wallace on the Shunpike at 1400. Rowley told Wallace that the cavalry lieutenant reported that Wallace would not move without written orders. "That's a damn lie!" was Wallace's response. Rowley then asked Wallace why he was using the Shunpike. Wallace responded that this was the route to Sherman and McClernand's camps. Rowley pulled Wallace aside and informed him that Sherman and McClernand had been pushed back almost to the river. Wallace was troubled by this news. Rowley then told Wallace that he was needed at Pittsburg Landing. Wallace countermarched his troops (instead of turning around he had the lead troops march back through the next in line). Wallace said he did this because he wanted his best troops in the front; but valuable time was lost.

Back at Pittsburg Landing Grant could not imagine what was keeping Wallace. At 1430 he sent Lieutenant Colonel James McPherson from his staff to hurry Wallace. Between 1530 and 1600 McPherson found Wallace. McPherson told Wallace that he was needed quickly and wondered why the lead elements were now halted. Wallace said he was allowing the trail elements time to close up because Grant “wanted the division, not part of it.”

Lew Wallace did not arrive at the battlefield until after dark on 6 April. Due to the vague orders and Wallace’s marching decisions, the 3d Division’s 5,800 men did not fight that day. For the rest of his life Wallace would have to defend his actions on 6 April. Why did he take the Shunpike? Why did he let his soldiers eat before they marched? Why did he countermarch? Why was he so slow?

Grant vented his feelings about Wallace in a letter written soon after the battle: “Had General Wallace been relieved from duty in the morning, and the same orders communicated to Brigadier General Morgan L. Smith (who would have been his successor), I do not doubt but the division would have been on the field of battle in the engagement before 10 o’clock of that eventful 6th of April. There is no estimating the difference this might have made in our casualties.”


Decision Exercise 1A: In this exercise, you are P.G.T. Beauregard. It is 0300 on 6 April. You are disheartened with the progress of the Army over the past couple days. You are certain that surprise has been lost and that Sidney Johnston has made a huge mistake by ordering the attack at dawn on the 6th of April against what you know are entrenched federal troops. You tried to convince him to give up the attack, but he decided against your recommendation.


What is your vision for how events will unfold?

What are your communications to Sidney Johnston?

What are your communications to your subordinate commanders and soldiers you meet?

Decision Exercise 2: In the next exercise, you are Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles, a Division Commander. You know the intent of the Army Commander to turn the left flank of the enemy, but there is a persistent salient in their lines that cannot seem to be reduced. You have tried 8 successive infantry charges, and all have failed.





| Wednesday, 10/19/11 | | | |
|---------------------|---------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 13:15 – 14:15 | Stand 2 | Hornet's Nest | Making Sound and Timely Decisions |

What does the theme for this stand mean to you?

From your preliminary study, why do you think this theme applies at this location?

Have you been in a similar position of leadership where this theme describes your challenge?

Make sound and timely decisions.

- Maintain situation awareness in order to anticipate needed actions.
- Develop contingencies and consider consequences.
- Improvise within the commander's intent to handle a rapidly changing environment.

STAND 2 – Fire correlation – Opportunities for aggressive action seldom appear and usually call for immediate action even though everything may not be perfect. Leaders must recognize that timely completion is very often more critical to overall success than slower more risk adverse completion of a task. Specific example = timely burnouts. More often than not burnouts are not completed in time to be affective. Firing is stopped with every little spot fire, even with heavy holding resources on hand. End result is loss of the burnout line as peak burning overtakes us. Understanding critical timing and acceptable risk to complete actions increase chance of success in the big picture.


The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Orientation:

By 1100 the Confederate corps commanders realized that corps integrity was lost. Bragg and Polk decided on their own to divide the battlefield into sectors: Bragg would command the right, Polk the center, and Hardee the left. Each corps commander would command the troops in his sector regardless of their original organization. At 1130 3,500 Confederate troops from four brigades—all of Shaver's and parts of Cleburne's, Wood's, and Stewart's) made a second attack. Their line stretched from Eastern Corinth Road to Corinth Road. This second attack faltered along the edge of the field.

After reorganizing the command structure, Bragg found COL Randal L. Gibson's brigade from BG Daniel Ruggles' division. Bragg immediately ordered Gibson to attack. At 1200 Gibson formed his four regiments and advanced. Unfamiliar with the terrain, Gibson advanced his men through a thicket by a streambed. The men stumbled forward through the rough terrain until they were right on top of the Union line. Suddenly the Union troops arose and blasted Gibson's men. Almost immediately the survivors of this "ambush" retreated in haste.

At 1215 Grant and his escort arrived at Prentiss' location. After receiving Prentiss' report, Grant told him to "maintain that position at all hazards." Grant additionally promised that Lew Wallace's division would soon arrive.



For a fourth time Bragg ordered Gibson back across the field. Apparently enraged that the attacks had all failed, Bragg sent staff officers to the regiments to encourage them, aggravating their commanders. At 1400 Gibson's troops attacked Sunken Road for the fourth time. By this stage of the battle, Gibson's men had become demoralized, and the attack ended very soon after it started. During these attacks, Gibson lost more than 25 percent of his men, whose bodies now littered Duncan Field and adjoining woods. At 1430 Bragg located COL R.G. Shaver who was in command of Hindman's brigade of Hardee's corps. Bragg ordered him to assault the Sunken Road. Shaver's troops slammed into Tuttle and Prentiss and soon retreated.

From 1030 to 1530 the Confederates had attacked the Union troops of W.H.L. Wallace and Prentiss along the Sunken Road eight times. All of the attacks were uncoordinated, had minimal artillery support, and were piecemeal. The fire was so severe that the Confederates said the fire reminded them of hornets flying by their heads. They would forever call this part of the field the Hornet's Nest. At 1530 the Union troops in the center were still holding on, but over the next few hours, the situation would change.

Confederate leaders now realized that infantry alone would not carry the line along the Sunken Road. Beginning at 1530 Confederate officers started gathering all available artillery units on the field. The officer who orchestrated this concentration is not really known definitely. BG Ruggles later asserted he was responsible, while Hardee's Chief of Artillery Major Francis Shoup also claimed credit. Needless to say numerous officers were probably responsible for this concentration, which by 1630, numbered 53 cannons. This was possibly the largest artillery concentration in North America up to that time. While the Confederates formed this line, a considerable artillery duel began. For 1 hour the cannoners traded fire, the Union gunners compelling a few Confederate artillery units to retire.

As more Confederate artillery units arrived and the Confederate bombardment reached its peak, the Union batteries on the ridge behind the Sunken Road now started to fall back. The Confederate artillery was setting the conditions for a successful attack. At 1630 a coordinated Confederate attack struck the defenders along the Sunken Road. Union units started to break. The first to go was Sweeney's brigade that was attacked frontally from across Duncan Field while additional Confederate units struck it from the north on its right flank. As Sweeney's men fell back, he rode to Wallace to tell him of the collapse. Wallace ordered the entire division to retire. Things were now very confused in the Union line; four of Wallace's regiments did not get the word to retire. Soon the Union line crumbled. Small units and individuals tried to withdraw as the Confederates closed around them. Prentiss found out that Wallace was pulling back, and at 1700 Prentiss also ordered a retreat.



Decision Exercise 2: In this exercise, you are Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles, a Division Commander. It is 1500 on the 6th of April. You know the intent of the Army Commander to turn the left flank of the enemy, but there is a persistent salient in their lines that cannot seem to be reduced. You have tried 8 successive infantry charges, and all have failed.


What is your vision for how events will unfold?

What are your communications to your Corps Commander?

What are your communications to the commanders of the various resources being dispatched to help you?

End State > Objectives > Strategy > Tactics

Decision Exercise 3: In the next exercise, you are Albert Sidney Johnston. It is 1500 on the 6th of April, and the federal left flank is not turning as you planned. Where will you position yourself and how will you overcome this battlefield friction imposed by that persistent Hornet's Nest?



| Wednesday, 10/19/11 | | | |
|---------------------|---------|---------------|--|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 14:45 – 15:30 | Stand 3 | Peach Orchard | Concentration and Mass at Decisive Point |

What does the theme for this stand mean to you?

From your preliminary study, why do you think this theme applies at this location?

Have you been in a similar position of leadership where this theme describes your challenge?

Develop your subordinates for the future.

- Clearly state expectations.
- Delegate those tasks that you are not required to do personally.
- Consider individual skill levels and development needs when assigning tasks.

STAND 3 – Fire correlation – Concentration or dispersion or resources? Economy of force or mass at decisive points. Do you try and hold the whole line, or only key parts of it? Massing resources for mutual support instead of putting in resources piecemeal. Dozers in tandem for example. Where does the leader need to take position on the fireline? As the incident increases in complexity, does the IC sometimes lose sight of the larger situation...or lose sight of the need for their leadership at a decisive point? When the leader is not where they need to be – and they can't be everywhere – who will fill the leadership void where they are not?

The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Orientation:

Johnston had been active the entire morning. He spent most of his time on the Confederate right, supervising activities there. At 0900 he rode into the recently captured camp of Miller's brigade. Seeing a Confederate officer carrying an armful of trophies, Johnston clamored, "None of that sir; we are not here for plunder!" Johnston regretted the strong rebuke and picking up a tin cup said, "Let this be my share of the spoils today."


After ordering Jackson and Chalmers to the far right, Johnston moved there. Early in the afternoon Breckinridge rode to Johnston and told him he had could not get his men to make a charge. Johnston rode in front of BG John Bowen's brigade, and with the tin cup he had "captured," Johnston tapped the soldiers' bayonets and told them, "I want you to show General Breckinridge and General Bragg what you can do with your bayonets and tooth picks."

At one point Johnston led an attack part of the way. During the charge, his uniform was shot through, and the sole of one of his boots was shot partially away. He was also nicked in the shoulder. After the attack, Johnston told Tennessee Governor Harris, a volunteer aide, "Governor, they came very near putting me hors de combat in that charge."

At 1415 Harris, recently returned from carrying on an order from Johnston, looked over at the army commander and noticed that he was pale and ready to fall from the saddle. Harris rode over, grabbed Johnston, and asked, "General, are you wounded?" Johnston replied, "Yes and I fear seriously." Harris, with the help of other staff officers, moved Johnston to the cover of the gully and took him from his horse. The staff officers ripped open Johnston's coat and shirt trying to find the wound. BG William Preston was a Johnston staff officer who was also his brother-in-law. Preston held Johnston's head and yelled, "Johnston, don't you know me?" At 1430 Johnston was dead.

Governor Harris recalled telling Beauregard of Johnston's death: "Immediately after the death of Albert Sydney Johnston I hurriedly sought out General Beauregard, whom I found sitting on his horse at Shiloh Church, and to whom I reported the

death of General Johnston. General Beauregard said nothing in reply to my announcement for some moments but seemed to be in a deep study. He then said, 'Well Governor, everything is progressing well, is it not?' I answered that it was as far as my observation extended and then turned my horse and rode away."



Decision Exercise 3: In this exercise, you are Albert Sidney Johnston. It is 1500 on the 6th of April, and the federal left flank is not turning as you planned. Where will you position yourself and how will you overcome this battlefield friction imposed by that persistent Hornet's Nest?

Has your vision changed?

What are your communications to your Corps Commanders?

End State > Objectives > Strategy > Tactics


Decision Exercise 3A: In the next exercise, you are P.G.T. Beauregard, now Commanding the Army of the Mississippi. What are your orders?

| Wednesday, 10/19/11 | | | |
|---------------------|---------|-------------|--|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 15:45 – 16:30 | Summary | Dill Branch | Consolidation, Assessment, and Preparation |

Employ your subordinates in accordance with their capabilities.

- Observe human behavior as well as fire behavior.
- Provide early warning to subordinates of tasks they will be responsible for.
- Consider team experience, fatigue and physical limitations when accepting assignments.

Orientation:



At 1430 Grant told his chief of staff, COL Joseph D. Webster, to begin forming a last line of defense on the ridge south of Pittsburg Landing. Using the time Sherman and McClelland gained at Jones Field and W.H.L. Wallace and Prentiss along the Sunken Road, Webster laid out a formidable line. Initially he established the position with three unused batteries (including a battery of 24-pound siege guns). As artillery units fell back from the front, Webster arranged for their resupply and then placed them in line. By 1700 Webster had 52 cannons under his control.

When Grant departed Savannah that morning, he did not know that MG Don Carlos Buell had arrived there the day before. Before leaving for the battlefield, Grant ordered BG William "Bull" Nelson of Buell's army to move his division down the east side of the river to Pittsburg Landing. Grant had promised guides, but none ever arrived. Nelson lost 6 hours trying to find a passable route on the flooded east side, but his division moved at 1300. Buell, meanwhile, took a

steamer to Pittsburg Landing where he met with Grant around 1300. The meeting was brief and revolved around moving Buell's troops to Pittsburg Landing.

At 1700 Nelson's lead brigade, commanded by COL Jacob Ammen, arrived across the river from Pittsburg Landing. Nelson arranged for boats in the river to start moving his men across, and by 1800 he had about 600 men west of the river and in line.


After reducing the pocket at the Hornet's Nest, Bragg believed that one more attack would destroy Grant's army. He placed artillery on a ridge south of Dill Branch and formed four brigades—Chalmers', Jackson's, Deas', and Anderson's—for an attack. All was ready by 1800 when Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades attacked. The men first had to cross the deep ravine of Dill Branch. As the men ascended the northern side, they met the fire of the gun line Webster had formed. Additionally, the gunboats Tyler and Lexington in the Tennessee River opposite the mouth of Dill Branch added large-caliber naval shells to the Federal defensive artillery barrage. Under such a concentrated bombardment, the Confederates did not stand long under this fire. As Chalmers and Jackson retreated, Bragg was surprised to see units to their left retiring. Beauregard had ordered a halt to the fighting for the day, directing his commanders to retire a short distance away.

At his headquarters at Shiloh Church, Beauregard received a telegram from Colonel Ben Helm saying that Buell's Army was near Decatur, Alabama, nowhere near the battlefield (Helm had seen one of Buell's divisions, not his whole army). He assessed his army to be exhausted and disorganized. He knew daylight was almost gone. Now armed with the incorrect information that Buell was far away, Beauregard ordered a halt to the fighting. He dispatched staff officers across the field with the message to end the day's action. Apparently, Beauregard planned to finish Grant in the morning. When Bragg learned of Beauregard's order, he was livid. As he considered what to do, he noticed troops falling back. Bragg exclaimed, "My God, my God, it is too late!"

Overnight Decision Exercise:

You are Pierre Beauregard. Following the death of Sidney Johnson, you have taken command of the Army of Mississippi. It is now the late evening of April 6th. The Army fought hard today and has hit a culminating point. You must assess current conditions and prepare for the next operational period starting at dawn. What information do you need, and how do you gather it? What are your orders to your commanders?

You will have the opportunity to issue those orders when we gather together again here in the morning.



| Thursday, 10/20/11 | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 08:15 – 08:45 | Day 2 Orientation | Dill Branch | Brief Beauregard's Orders |

Keep your subordinates informed.

- Provide accurate and timely briefings.
- Give the reason (intent) for assignments and tasks.
- Make yourself available to answer questions at appropriate times.


Decision Exercise 3A: In this exercise, you are P.G.T. Beauregard, now Commanding the Army of the Mississippi. What are your orders?

End State > Objectives > Strategy > Tactics

Beauregard spent the night in Sherman's tent by Shiloh Church. He met with each corps commander during the night. All of the Confederate commanders were ecstatic. They decided to rest the men and reorganize in the morning to complete the destruction of Grant's army. When the rains came at 2200, the Confederates occupied the Union camps. During the night Hardee's men camped south of Sarah Bell Field, Breckinridge in the center, Bragg in the west around Sherman's camps, and for unknown reasons, Polk camped at his bivouac site of 5 April, almost 2 miles from the field. Pond's brigade did not get the word, and it stayed in position in close proximity to the Union troops.

Not all of the Confederates retired to the captured tents. COL Nathan Bedford Forrest conducted a reconnaissance by dressing his men in captured blue overcoats. Forrest's men moved to where they could see the landing and were surprised to learn Buell's troops were arriving. Forrest found Hardee and passed along this intelligence bonanza. Hardee told him to go to Beauregard's headquarters, but Forrest could not find it. Forrest returned and ordered another reconnaissance, which again learned that more of Buell's troops were arriving. No one would take Forrest's report.

The Confederate commanders slept in captured tents that night thinking that only the routed Army of the Tennessee was to their front. They were convinced that Buell was far away. They were sure of victory in the morning. Forrest held the critical information but could not get it to the proper authorities.



| Thursday, 10/20/11 | | | |
|--------------------|---------|----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 09:00 – 09:30 | Stand 4 | Pittsburg Land | Maintaining Situational Awareness |

Build the team.

- Conduct frequent debriefings with the team to identify lessons learned.
- Recognize individual and team accomplishments and reward them appropriately.
- Apply disciplinary measures equally.

STAND 4 – Fire correlation – Intelligence gathering and verification must be ongoing and constant. Trust levels between leaders and subordinates must be developed. Constant awareness of changes in terrain, weather, forces, hazards, etc.

The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Orientation:


The Army of the Tennessee had been roughly handled on 6 April. It had lost most of its camps and had been driven back 2 miles. Its back was to the Tennessee River. One division commander had been mortally wounded and left on the field, and another had been captured. Numerous brigade and regiment commanders were on the casualty list. Near dark Lieutenant Colonel James McPherson joined Grant around a fire. McPherson asked Grant if he should prepare to retreat. Grant replied, "Retreat? No! I propose to attack at daylight and whip them." At 1915 Lew Wallace's division arrived on the field and joined Sherman. Grant now had 5,800 fresh troops. The Army of the Tennessee had been bent but not broken.

After the Confederate withdrawal, Nelson continued shuttling Army of the Ohio units across the river, completing the move at 2100. Nelson's troops saw quite a spectacle as they arrived at Pittsburg Landing. Up to 10,000 men of the Army of the Tennessee were cowering below the bluffs. Grant had been trying to get these men to rejoin their outfits, but they wanted no more fighting and disregarded him. These sulkers had been trying to get on any boat that landed, which hampered evacuating the wounded and resupplying the Army. As Nelson's troops landed, these survivors told tales of woe and warned the men. Nelson became irritated and shouted, "Damn your souls, if you won't fight, get out of the way, and let men come here who will!"

At 2100 the first troops of BG Thomas Crittenden's division of the Army of the Ohio arrived. Crittenden's men arrived on boats from Savannah. By 2300 all of Crittenden's men were ashore. Buell would continue moving his troops to Pittsburg Landing during the night; he would eventually have 18,000 men available on 7 April. When complete, the Union dispositions ran (from west to east): Lew Wallace's division, Sherman's division, McClernand's division, Hurlbut's division, Crittenden's division, and Nelson's division. Prentiss' division was effectively destroyed, and W.H.L. Wallace's division (under COL Tuttle) was behind the line trying to reorganize.

Buell and Grant had only one short meeting on 6 April, and they did not discuss operations for 7 April. Both men were army commanders and independent of each other. There was no overall commander on site on the Union side. However, both commanders had independently decided to attack.

At 2200 rain began to fall, and it came down in torrents. The Union soldiers had no tents or proper equipment, having lost it all when their camps were overrun. The men just had to lie in the rain, trying to get what sleep they could. Adding to the misery, the *Tyler* and *Lexington* fired shots all night long in the hope of preventing the Confederates from sleeping. They also prevented the Union troops from getting any sleep.



Decision Exercise 4: In this exercise, you are Ulysses Grant. It is 2200 on the 6th of April, and your troops have been badly beaten. Fresh troops from the Army of the Ohio are arriving. You have a strong position from which to defend. Your back is up against the Tennessee River, which is a viable escape route for your Army. You fear that in the morning, the confederates may make a strong attack against you.

What is your vision for how events will unfold?

What are your communications to your Corps Commanders?

What are your communications to Don Carlos Buell, commanding the Army of the Ohio?

End State > Objectives > Strategy > Tactics

Decision Exercise 5: In the next exercise, you are William Hardee. It is dawn on April 7th. Your corps – a seemingly the entire Army of Mississippi has weathered the night but is very much disorganized. Braxton Bragg commands the western part of the field, you command the eastern part up against the Tennessee River. Leonidas Polk has withdrawn 2 miles south to make his camp there. The troops are looting the captured federal encampments from yesterday. There is no effective

organized structure above the Regimental level. You know two critical things: Pierre Beauregard has sent a victory message to Richmond overnight, and Bedford Forrest has reported to you the Don Carlos Buell and the Army of the Ohio has been crossing the River at Pittsburg Landing.

| Thursday, 10/20/11 | | | |
|--------------------|---------|--------------|------------------|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 09:45 – 11:00 | Stand 5 | Grant's Line | Anchoring Flanks |

Set the example.

- Share the hazards and hardships with your subordinates.
- Don't show discouragement when facing set backs.
- Choose the difficult right over the easy wrong

STAND 5 – Fire correlation – STAND 5 – Anchoring Flanks. Pay attention to fireground geometry. “Flank in the air”. Refusing or protecting flanks. On Leadership... Persistence. Positive Attitude. Art and Science of leadership. Be Tactically and technically competent. Take time to think and to organize. Maintain situational awareness and “mindfulness”. Take action... Choose the difficult right over the easy wrong.

The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Orientation:

At 0500 on 7 April, Buell's attack started with the advance of Nelson's division. Nelson had all three of his brigades on the line and slowly advanced south against almost no opposition. By 0700 Nelson had reached Cloud Field and halted while BG Thomas Crittenden's two brigades formed on his right. With two divisions now on the line the attack continued south. Soon the Union troops encountered Confederate pickets who fired and quickly fell back. Nelson's troops entered Wicker Field and began to receive artillery and concentrated infantry fire. For 90 minutes Nelson's men fought a long-range battle with Confederate troops in Sarah Bell Field. Nelson had not brought his artillery with him, so Buell assigned one of Crittenden's batteries to him. While fighting in Wicker Field, BG Lovell Rousseau's brigade from BG Alexander McCook's division arrived from the landing and joined the line on Crittenden's right. At 1000 the Union line resumed the advance. Nelson's division moved to the north end of Sarah Bell Field and Crittenden to the Sunken Road.

Hardee was surprised that his pickets in Cloud and Wicker Fields had been pushed back. He was expecting an easy morning, but now Union troops were pushing hard against his position. Hardee threw any brigade he could find into the line to stem the Union attacks. By 1100 Nelson and Crittenden attacked south from the Sunken Road and from the peach orchard in Sarah Bell Field. COL Sanders Bruce's brigade and COL Ammen's brigade from Nelson's division assaulted all the way to Davis Field, capturing a Confederate battery. Several Confederate regiments were thrown in to stem this penetration. The battle seesawed back and forth, but eventually, the Union troops withdrew to positions along the Sunken Road.

Hardee, seeing the Union troops retreating, ordered a counterattack. A makeshift brigade made of remnants led the attack. Having been told that friendly troops were to the front, this ad hoc unit did not cover his line with skirmishers. As they entered Sarah Bell Field, Moore's men were decimated when Ammen's brigade opened fire. Seeing Moore's difficulties, Hardee sent a mixture of the other units to attack Nelson. (Confederate organizational structure had disintegrated by this time, even at brigade level. Commanders organized demi-brigades from available regiments, gave them a commander, and sent them forward.) The combatants traded fire for a while, but by 1200 the Confederates had withdrawn from Sarah Bell Field and Nelson had pulled back to Wicker Field.

To the west in Crittenden's area, the fighting also seesawed. COL Robert Trabue's brigade of Confederates attacked COL Morgan Smith's brigade of Federals but was repulsed. Crittenden's division followed Trabue all the way to the Hamburg-Purdy Road, but Confederate artillery forced it back to Duncan Field.

By this time, McCook's entire division had arrived and was now in line on Crittenden's right. Bragg commanded this part of the field for Beauregard and ordered Russell's brigade to attack the Federals. Russell was easily repulsed, and McCook pursued him. McCook's troops made it to Review Field before counterattacks and artillery forced them back. During this fight, Kentucky Governor George W. Johnson, serving as a private in the Confederate 4th Kentucky, was mortally wounded.

A little after 1200 Buell's troops attacked again. Until 1400 Buell's troops fought hard to gain ground. On the left Nelson's men made steady progress and by 1400 had reached the Hamburg-Purdy Road. Crittenden pressed down Eastern Corinth Road until he, too, reached Hamburg-Purdy Road. On the right McCook advanced to the west along the Corinth-Pittsburg Landing Road. McCook's western movement opened a gap between himself and Crittenden, which was filled by brigades from Grant's army that had been in reserve. The disorganized, battle-weary Confederate army had held up the 18,000 fresh troops of Buell for 6 hours, but now the tide was turning.

Decision Exercise 5: In this exercise, you are William Hardee. It is dawn on April 7th. Your corps – a seemingly the entire Army of Mississippi has weathered the night but is very much disorganized. Braxton Bragg commands the western part of the field, you command the eastern part up against the Tennessee River. Leonidas Polk has withdrawn 2 miles south to make his camp there. The troops are looting the captured federal encampments from yesterday. There is no effective organized structure above the Regimental level. You know two critical things: Pierre Beauregard has sent a victory message to Richmond overnight, and Bedford Forrest has reported to you the Don Carlos Buell and the Army of the Ohio has been crossing the River at Pittsburg Landing.

Based on the information you have, and the battlefield geometry, what is your vision for how events will unfold?


What do you understand is the organization of your part of the line?

What are you going to do about your organization?

What are your communications... to whom?

End State > Objectives > Strategy > Tactics

Decision Exercise 6: In the next exercise, you are Pierre Beauregard. You know that the Army of the Ohio is in Alabama. You have won a great victory on this field yesterday. Your troops have slept in Yankee tents and feasted on Yankee chow. Today you will finish off the Army of the Tennessee. It is now 1200 Noon on the 7th. Your lookouts report that the Army of Ohio is here...attacking you in strength! What do you understand? What do you decide? What do you communicate to your Corps Commanders?



| Thursday, 10/20/11 | | | |
|--------------------|---------|----------------------|------------------|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 12:30 – 14:00 | Stand 6 | Confederate Monument | Plan for defeat? |

Seek responsibility and accept responsibility for your actions.

- Accept full responsibility for and correct poor team performance.
- Credit subordinates for good performance.
- Keep your superiors informed of your action.

STAND 6 – Fire correlation – Success is easy to plan for, but hard to get. Failure is easy to get, but hard to plan for. As you transition from one operating period to the next, you naturally do your best to plan for success. LCES and the watchout situations are all about managing risk, and planning to live successfully through periods of violent uncertainty -- chaos – the realm between order and disorder in which there is great opportunity for the creativity of the commander. But what is your plan for defeat? How do you report defeat? Media interaction? Strategic effect of your communications? How do you create conditions before a defeat to bring your organization through it successfully?

The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Orientation:


COL Preston Pond had not withdrawn during the night, and his tired Confederate troops faced Wallace's fresh division. Pond's battle-weary troops did not stand long, and Beauregard ordered them to the rear as a reserve. Wallace's troops retook Jones Field. In response to this threat, Gibson's and Wood's brigades were ordered to attack. This attack was initially successful, but Sherman brought his battered division on line and pushed the Confederates back. While Gibson and Wood were attacking, other Confederate units were forming a defensive line south of Jones Field. BG Daniel Ruggles gathered a group of unit fragments and Cleburne's and Anderson's brigades, all badly pounded the previous day.

The rest of Grant's troops arrived. McClernand formed on Sherman's left, and Hurlbut formed on McClernand's left. At 1030 Grant's army moved forward en masse. In a desperate effort to respond, Bragg ordered Cleburne to attack, an order he protested. Yet Cleburne attacked and his brigade was destroyed. The Confederate line was now untenable, and its units slowly began to give ground. Cheatham's division had spent the night well south of the field but had moved north early that morning. Hearing of the Union thrust, Cheatham advanced and ran into Sherman and McClernand. Cheatham stopped the Federal divisions, and when Wallace saw this, he ordered his division into the defense despite having no enemy to his front. Cheatham traded fire with the Union troops but eventually was forced back. While Cheatham was fighting, Bragg had formed another defensive line by Water Oaks Pond. Wallace, Sherman, and McClernand now advanced against this line and a 2-hour fight resulted. During this fighting, Beauregard was all over this part of the field, personally leading units into the fight.

At 1330 McCook's division advanced from Duncan Field and slammed into the flank of Bragg's line. Bragg, pressured on the front by Wallace, Sherman, and McClernand and on the flank by McCook started to fall back south of the Hamburg-Purdy Road. Beauregard formed a small counterattack force built around Wood's brigade. These men splashed across Water Oaks Pond and pushed back McCook's men. McCook repositioned his troops and forced Wood back across Water Oaks Pond.

Beauregard now had only one unit left, Pond's brigade. Since withdrawing from Jones Field, Pond had been out of the fighting but stayed busy. Ruggles had ordered him to the far left. As he was moving, he was ordered to the far right to support Hardee. Before he could get there, Beauregard ordered him to the center in reserve. As he was complying, Polk ordered him to support his line. As he moved to Polk, Pond received an order from Beauregard to report to him. Beauregard personally led Pond's brigade, which slammed into the advancing Union troops and had momentarily stopped the Federal attack, but he was soon forced back. The Union troops crossed the Hamburg-Purdy Road at 1430.

With the Confederate line on the verge of collapse, a staff officer asked Beauregard, "General, do you not think our troops in the condition of a lump of sugar thoroughly soaked with water, but yet preserving its original shape, though ready to dissolve?" Beauregard replied, "I intend to withdraw in a few moments." True to his word, Beauregard sent staff officers around the field ordering the army back to Corinth.




Decision Exercise 6: In this exercise, you are Pierre Beauregard. You know that the Army of the Ohio is in Alabama. You have won a great victory on this field yesterday. Your troops have slept in Yankee tents and feasted on Yankee chow. Today you will finish off the Army of the Tennessee. It is now 1200 Noon on the 7th. Your lookouts report that the Army of Ohio is here...attacking you in strength!

What do you understand?

What do you decide?

What do you communicate to your Corps Commanders?



| Thursday, 10/20/11 | | | |
|--------------------|------------|---------------|---|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 14:15 – 15:00 | Stand 7 | Shiloh Church | A Bias for Action – Forrest at Fallen Timbers |
| 15:00 – 16:00 | Leadership | Shiloh Church | Values |


Know yourself and seek improvement.

- Know the strengths/weaknesses in your character and skill level.
- Ask questions of peers and superiors.
- Actively listen to feedback from subordinates.

STAND 7 – Fire correlation – Leaders need to lead from the front. Division Supervisors, Operations Section Chiefs and even incident Commanders need to be seen and personally survey the ground and the suppression actions on occasion. Leaders need to not only direct but also actively participate as part of IMT when critical junctures are reached.

The retired Marine advisor will then provide a more detailed orientation to a key part of the Battle of Shiloh, and will provide a U.S. Marine perspective on leadership.

Orientation:




On the morning of 8 April Sherman, with two infantry brigades and two squadrons of cavalry slowly, pursued the Confederates south. At Fallen Timbers, Sherman ran into a small cavalry force under COL Nathan Bedford Forrest's command. When Forrest saw the lead Union regiment forming, he charged. Forrest's charge broke up the Union troops, but while withdrawing, Forrest was shot in the hip at point blank range. Legend has it that Forrest scooped up a Union infantryman and used him as a shield as he rode away, dropping him when he was out of danger. Sherman was convinced the Confederates were gone and returned to the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing. The Battle of Shiloh was over.

| | Killed | Wounded | Missing | Total |
|-------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|
| Army of the Tennessee | 1,513 | 6,601 | 2,830 | 10,944 |
| Army of the Ohio | 241 | 1,807 | 55 | 2,103 |
| Union Totals | 1,754 | 8,408 | 2,885 | 13,047 |
| Army of the Mississippi | <u>1,728</u> | <u>8,012</u> | <u>959</u> | <u>10,699</u> |
| Total | 3,482 | 16,420 | 3,844 | 23,746 |

Know your subordinates and look out for their well being.

- Put the safety of your subordinates above all other objectives.
- Take care of your subordinate's needs.
- Resolve conflicts between individuals on the team.

| Thursday, 10/20/11 | | | |
|--|---|---------------|--------|
| Time | Stand | Location | Theme |
| 15:00 – 16:00 | Leadership | Shiloh Church | Values |
| Wildland Fire Leadership Values and Principles | | | |
| Duty | Be proficient in your job, both technically and as a leader. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Take charge when in charge. – Adhere to professional standard operating procedures. – Develop a plan to accomplish given objectives. | | |
| | Make sound and timely decisions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Maintain situation awareness in order to anticipate needed actions. – Develop contingencies and consider consequences. – Improvise within the commander's intent to handle a rapidly changing environment. | | |
| | Ensure that tasks are understood, supervised, and accomplished. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Issue clear instructions. – Observe and assess actions in progress without micro-managing. – Use positive feedback to modify duties, tasks and assignments when appropriate. | | |
| | Develop your subordinates for the future. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Clearly state expectations. – Delegate those tasks that you are not required to do personally. – Consider individual skill levels and development needs when assigning tasks. | | |
| Respect | Know your subordinates and look out for their well being. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Put the safety of your subordinates above all other objectives. – Take care of your subordinate's needs. – Resolve conflicts between individuals on the team. | | |
| | Keep your subordinates informed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Provide accurate and timely briefings. – Give the reason (intent) for assignments and tasks. – Make yourself available to answer questions at appropriate times. | | |
| | Build the team. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Conduct frequent debriefings with the team to identify lessons learned. – Recognize individual and team accomplishments and reward them appropriately. – Apply disciplinary measures equally. | | |
| | Employ your subordinates in accordance with their capabilities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Observe human behavior as well as fire behavior. – Provide early warning to subordinates of tasks they will be responsible for. – Consider team experience, fatigue and physical limitations when accepting assignments. | | |
| Integrity | Know yourself and seek improvement. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Know the strengths/weaknesses in your character and skill level. – Ask questions of peers and superiors. – Actively listen to feedback from subordinates. | | |
| | Seek responsibility and accept responsibility for your actions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Accept full responsibility for and correct poor team performance. – Credit subordinates for good performance. – Keep your superiors informed of your actions. | | |
| | Set the example. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Share the hazards and hardships with your subordinates. – Don't show discouragement when facing set backs. – Choose the difficult right over the easy wrong. | | |





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